Set-piece situations can define a team’s season and secure vital points, which can be the difference between staying up and relegation, or between continental qualification and mid-table obscurity.
As a result, like everything in football, more focus and detail are being put into set-pieces, with different strategies and trends used by different teams.
In this series of set-piece analysis articles, using routines and data, I will look at offensive and defensive trends across several leagues from the 19/20 season, with this week’s focus on the Premier League‘s offensive trends around the near-post zone.
To assess trends in this tactical analysis, we will mainly look at the expected goals and the number of deliveries attempted into specific zones from corners, with certain teams standing out in each area.
This piece will focus on near-post deliveries and the routines clubs in the league use.
Premier League Goals And xG Stats
The most basic stat to look at from set-pieces that provides some context on each team is goals scored and their expected goals.
We can see below a chart detailing this, with the average number of goals scored from set pieces this season being 6.5.
The two best sides from set pieces in the league this season, according to Wyscout, are Liverpool and Bournemouth, while the worst teams are Crystal Palace, Watford, and Norwich.
We can compare each team’s goals to their xG from set-pieces below, with both averages for each metric also placed on the graph.
We can see Everton has generated the highest xG from set pieces (4.86), with West Ham (3.84), Brighton (3.94), and Burnley (3.71) also ranking well.
The worst performers in xG were Wolves (1.42), Watford (1.41), and Aston Villa (1.28), all of whom fell well below the average of 2.63.
The differential for each team can also be seen in the gap between the two bars for each team, with the biggest overperformances unsurprisingly coming from the teams with the most goals, including Liverpool, Bournemouth, Newcastle, and Aston Villa. But what does this tell us?
xG ranks chances from set-pieces as very low, and so, as you will have noticed, the xG generated is low, but scoring ten goals per season or scoring four can make a massive difference.
Data By Zone
One of the main trends I was interested in investigating was the number of crosses from corners going into each zone, and how effective each zone was in generating chances.
For this, I calculated the average number of attempts per zone across the whole season, as well as the average shots and xG per team.
But before we get into the trends highlighted, we must look at the definitions of each zone, as there are some limitations in this regard.
We can see a graphic below showing the most-used zones by Manchester City this season, with the near post and short corner zones the most used.
We can also see how Wyscout defines each zone, with the main limitation, in my opinion, being the near-post zone, which is the focus of this piece.
Wyscout has the near-post zone as from the edge of the box to the edge of the six-yard box, meaning if a corner is delivered into what I call the ‘golden zone’, then it won’t be considered a near-post delivery.
This ‘golden zone’ is located around the near outside corner of the six-yard box and is a key area where many deliveries go, simply because it is the closest distance to both the goal and the ball carrier, providing a useful angle.
We can see below this zone highlighted, where Man City are punished by Norwich when they place Raheem Sterling as the zonal marker of this area of the box and concede.
Now, suppose I were usually writing a set-piece analysis. In that case, I’d term this a deeper near-post delivery, as the ball stays on the near side of the post.
According to Wyscout, a delivery into this zone could be a penalty area if it is outside the six-yard box, or a GK zone if it is marginally inside. As a result, some of the terminology and data has to be scrutinized slightly.
A very large proportion of near-post deliveries may therefore be failed attempts to deliver the ball into a different zone, as it is fairly common for players not to get the delivery past the first player.
Equally, they could be flick-ons in order to get a higher xG chance in another area.
We can see the data and some of the trends below.
Most deliveries went into the GK zone and near-post area, while most shots were generated from the far post and GK zone.
For almost the same number of attempts, the near post zone averaged 2 fewer shots and a much lower xG than the GK zone, a trend I’ve discussed briefly but will further discuss later.
The zones are also ranked in ascending order by average xG per attempt, with the GK zone marginally offering more xG per attempt, which may seem obvious given its proximity to the goal.
The penalty area was the most efficient way to get a shot on goal, with on average 3.6 attempts needed in order to get one shot.
In comparison, staggeringly, 8.9 attempts were needed to generate one shot on average in the near post area, which again reinforces my point about Wyscout’s zones not being great on a whole league level.
Certain teams display different trends and football tactics in each zone.
Now we will move on to how each team performs in the near post zone, making the data more usable by allowing teams to be compared, and we won’t rely on averages to draw conclusions.
Near Post Zone
Below is a graph I generated showing each team’s deliveries into a zone (blue) and xG generated (orange), which can help us identify who has been efficient and who has been wasteful with their deliveries and/or chances.
If the point is at the top of the bar, the team is performing as expected compared to its deliveries; if it is above the bar, they are ‘over-performing’; if it is below, they are ‘under-performing’.
We can see that Man City and Arsenal lead the way in xG and attempted deliveries, with Arsenal posting a higher xG despite fewer attempts than Man City.
Liverpool also rank highly on xG per attempt, while Wolves, Norwich, and Watford appear to be underperforming. We’ll now move on to each team’s tactics around the near post zone.
Manchester City Set-Piece Tactics
As we can see in the stats above, City use near post routines often, and have decent success from it in terms of xG.
This kind of routine or structure, shown below, is a common method. City completely vacate the back post region and set runners up from around the penalty spot.
One player sometimes occupies the zonal markers of the six-yard box.
The target player for this set-piece is always the player who starts on the zonal marker furthest from the ball, as we see Rodri do here.
The deepest Man City players (those closest to the back post zone) are usually agile, quick players, such as Sergio Agüero here.
Rodri is positioned on the deeper zonal marker, to run from the blind side of the near post marker.
The central player ideally doesn’t want to follow him, leaving ample space in front of the goalkeeper, and it is difficult for the near-post player to react, as they can’t see Rodri running from behind.
If the central player does follow as they do here, Rodri has the advantage of being ball-side rather than goal-side, and so has a better chance of winning the ball.
The spacing here is also excellent, with the two runners from deep close to one another not running to occupy the near post area, giving Rodri more space and not crowding the area with opposition players.
As a result, we see Rodri win the header and flick the ball on.
The central player follows him but can’t get close enough to stop the header.
Agüero doesn’t require any blockers and uses a double movement by feinting to run inside and then changing direction, which, due to his low centre of gravity, allows him to get around his marker.
Rodri’s header is slightly too high, however, which prevents a goalscoring opportunity at the back post.
In a separate example from the same game, we see the same principles here.
Rodri again stays on the ball side of his zonal-oriented marker, but on the blindside of the near-post player.
The player closest to the back post zone is, this time, Raheem Sterling, again an agile, quick player capable of accelerating past his marker.
We can see another example of this below, with now two players in the six-yard box, but again, Rodri is moving from deep on the blindside of the near post player.
The delivery is flatter in this example, which means the ball arrives at Rodri’s feet and he can do very little with it.
However, again, Rodri’s movement allows him to receive the ball.
We can see here, with the same movement again, that Rodri gets into the near post zone, where he scores from a 0.10 xG chance, highlighting the low xG values associated with set-piece goals.
City can also occasionally place two players in the six-yard box and rotate positions several times, with one player occupying the furthest player and then moving to the near post, while the other player does the opposite.
This disrupts the timing and decision-making of the near-post player, who is constantly anticipating a player running ahead of them and winning the header; decoys upset this anticipation.
City have also used a more basic near post routine, with the same idea behind it but a different structure.
Here, the player closest to the near post zone makes a quick run into the near post zone, while again two agile players at the back post prepare to receive a flick-on.
This kind of routine allows the initial near-post header to be at a better angle and therefore easier to direct to the back post; however, with no blindside run, it is also easier for the opposition to defend, as they can see and track movements much more easily.
Rodri marginally gets to the ball ahead of his marker, and again, Sterling and Agüero evade their markers and get free in the back post zone.
But again, the header cannot be directed towards the zone, partially due to the Spurs‘ marking.
As mentioned previously, City have been particularly poor at goalscoring from set-pieces this season, despite the analysis above.
Although the set-piece routine mentioned above creates opportunities for free players at the back post, its execution is complex.
The header from the near post player’s blindside is challenging to execute and direct when facing the opposite direction of where you want the ball to go, while the header explained above is easier to execute but easier for the opposition to manage.
As a result, City have struggled to generate many meaningful chances from this area, like many teams. It is worth noting that if a flick-on does occur and the goal is scored, it would register as a goal in another zone.
Still, from this near post zone, City have struggled to generate chances in this way, with the remaining xG chances in this zone made up of poor-quality chances and some dubiously rated xG values.
Arsenal Set-Piece Tactics
Although Arsenal’s new manager, Mikel Arteta, has brought this set-piece routine with him, the Club had already been using it regularly throughout the season, resulting in a high xG.
We can see an example of the near post being exploited here, with Callum Chambers making a very simple near-post run, and Norwich’s terrible coverage failing to pick him up.
The run requires no blocking or disguise, but the delivery is into the exact zone Wyscout classes as the near post, and the header is cleared off the line at the far post.
We can see here in a game with Freddie Ljungberg in charge, Arsenal use a very similar routine to Man City.
Lacazette starts on the furthest zonal player and makes a blindside run towards the near post, while others make a run towards the far post.
The blind-side run again means Lacazette can beat the opposition player to the ball, resulting in a low xG chance that Arsenal nearly scores from at the back post.
The initial header from Lacazette was rated as 0.06 xG
In the same game, Arsenal scored from a very similar situation.
Again, you guessed it: a blind-side run from Lacazette into the near post zone allows him to win the initial header, which has an xG value of 0.07.
Arsenal may well be generating more xG in this area, but they are also far more clinical in these kinds of areas, and perhaps generate more xG due to their greater aerial ability compared to City, as well as their improved delivery at times.
As a result, Arsenal have managed five more goals from set-pieces than City this season, and generated more goals and xG despite using fewer attempts in this zone.
In one final example, we see a slight adaptation: Lacazette makes his usual movement to block the near post marker, setting up David Luiz with a 0.20 xG chance that goes over the bar.
There are other examples of these movements and goals from Arsenal, but some come at the near post within the six-yard box, such as their goal against Man United.
As a result, I haven’t included them in this analysis.
Liverpool Set Piece Tactics
Liverpool are also a side who use the near post frequently and have generated a decent xG from this. Here are a few interesting routines from them exploiting the near post area.
Here is Liverpool’s initial structure, and Henderson and Mané clearly communicate the routine, with Henderson gesturing for Mané towards the six-yard box and to the right.
The result is this routine, where Mané moves to occupy the near post zone player at an angle that forces the player to move slightly towards him.
This opens up the inside angle for Henderson to run into and receive the ball, where he mistimes his kick.
Nevertheless, it is a clever routine to create a small amount of space.
We can see another routine here, based on players’ movement.
Here, Liverpool form a cluster of players to set up potential blocks, and Henderson remains on the outside of the block.
This prevents him from marking initially due to the cluster in front, and makes his run towards the near post harder to see and track, as the block in front allows him to arc his run while protected by players ahead.
Therefore, Wolves cannot track Henderson’s run, and he arrives at the ball and flicks it on, where one player at the back post stops a certain goal for Roberto Firmino.
Watford Set-Piece Tactics
Okay, so I’ve covered the teams that have generated the most xG in this zone, so what about the worst teams in this area?
If we refer back to the graph, we see that Watford are probably the worst performers in this area, with 50 attempts generating 0.21 xG.
For Watford, a combination of poor movement, execution, and delivery has contributed to a dismal return, with Wyscout claiming only 1 shot in 50 attempts.
Watford have a habit of picking out this zone, relying on pure aerial ability and duel-winning rather than intelligent movement.
In this first example, Djibril Sidibé moves to match the Watford player’s run, opening a space behind him that Everton doesn’t adjust to.
Luckily, Watford don’t adjust either, and there is no intelligent run or change of direction from either the other runners or the near-post player. All players just run straight or don’t move at all, with Danny Welbeck, who is closest to this space, making no movement.
To top it off, the delivery is poor, and Everton can clear.
In this example, Watford do well initially to dismark their opponents.
Still, the target player runs into the near post space, which is already occupied, and no attempt has been made to manipulate this player’s positioning.
Furthermore, if they do win a flick on, the positioning of a player virtually on the goal line commits Burnley players further back and gives them a greater chance of dealing with the second ball.
Conclusion
This piece aimed to give an initial insight into some trends in the Premier League regarding set-pieces, focusing mainly on the routines used by sides that most often use the near-post zone.
The near-post zone is an area that gives relatively low xG but can generate chances from second balls, which can (within Wyscout’s definition) hinder its xG metric within this context.
As a result, actual footage allows us to spot trends within routines and analyse what is or isn’t successful, and hopefully, this piece has done that.
This will be the first of hopefully a long-running series, with the next piece focusing on short corners and their use, followed by the far post and the goalkeeper zone.
