Barcelona have suffered two damaging defeats under Hansi Flick, which has thrown their season into chaos.
Girona pressed Barcelona and, crucially, often exposed their high line.
Some of Hansi Flick’s weaknesses in the last two games have been exposed, as he has also criticised the players’ attitude and intensity after the damaging 4-0 loss in the Copa Del Rey to Atlético Madrid.
Under Flick, Barca play a high line, and because their attack is brimming with confidence and depth, they often outscore opponents quickly.
What they haven’t managed to do in the last two games is keep the door closed at the other end.
Now, an attack with Lamine Yamal, Raphinha, etc. had its chances (as it should), but what must be taken into account is that Girona tightened the middle of the pitch.
The Catalan club looked most threatening when Girona’s attacks broke down, and they were afforded space.
This tactical analysis looks at how Girona struck Barcelona constantly whilst testing their high line, bravely playing past the press, and how compact Girona were in the middle of the park.
Girona Vs Barcelona Lineups & Formations
The hosts, Girona, played in a 4-4-2 formation, while Barcelona played in a 4-2-3-1 formation.
Paulo Gazzaniga started in goal with Daley Blind and Vitor Reis pairing each other in centre-back.
The full-backs were Arnau Martinez and Hugo Rincon to round off the back four.
Veteran Axel Witsel started in central midfield next to Ivan Martin with Ukrainian Viktor Tsyangkov on the right wing and Bryan Gil on the opposite wing on the left.
Whilst Thomas Lemar supported Vladyslav Vanat up front.
Up against Girona, Barça started with Joan Garcia in goal, Pau Cubarsi and Eric Garcia at centre-back, with the left-back Gerard Martin and Joules Kounde on the opposite wing at right-back.
In midfield, the industrious Frenkie de Jong paired with Dani Olmo in a pivot.
The front three, from left to right, are Lamine Yamal, Fermin Lopez, and Raphinha.
The lone striker was Ferran Torres.
Barcelona’s Salient Missed Chances
I use the word ‘salient’ in the subheading because it tells where a lot of Barcelona’s chances came from.
If you take a look at the image below, they break quickly when Girona are caught with lots of men pushed up the pitch in attack.
There is no problem with attacking in this manner; the point is that, at times, Barcelona found this to be the most effective method of attack.
Yamal missed the chance above, and although it’s brilliant that the Blaugrana know when to attack quickly and when the chance to score is there, the number of times Girona limited their progression in the centre of the pitch was important to Girona’s win.
Girona used players to ‘trap’ the La Liga giants into one zone.
This meant that when the ball went wide for progression, the inside midfielder, forward, and the other central midfielder trapped the opponent into a corner.
We observed this frequently against Ruben Amorim’s Manchester United, for example, mainly because much of his build-up was wide.
The emphasis from Barca to go wide in build-up is because they have adaptable midfielders and strikers, as well as Yamal on one side.
In the above attack, Flick’s side ends up going long and wide, more in hope than with precision.
So, if Barca went wide, Girona used pressing to trap them in one zone.
From the above image, Barcelona have four players in behind Girona’s midfield and almost no idea how to get the ball to them.
The players in the half-space are meant to receive the ball in tight zones and small pockets, but Girona’s midfield four is too compact.
The move above results in the attack simply breaking down.
What you had then was Girona stopping Barcelona in the middle of the pitch by being compact; if they were in deep build-up and trying to go wide, Girona would trap them into a single zone where it’s hard to get out.
The passage of play above exemplifies Barca’s attack perfectly.
As shown, they are in a wide 3-2 build-up with two pivot players, and when one of them attempts a pass to an attacker in the middle, given the tight central area, the ball is turned over.
It turned Barcelona’s attack into a Girona one, and, equally, note how many players Barca have thrown forward.
There are now only three defenders wide, and two midfielders far apart from each other in the middle.
It’s the idea and process of ensuring that the lines in the middle are centrally compact, while recognising the possibility of creating defence into attack.
It’s also notable how brave and effective Girona were in turning an ‘attack’ by Barcelona into their own.
The above is after Barca’s build-up in a 3-2 and an attempt to get the ball to Dani Olmo.
Daley Blind steps out all the way from centre-back and then moves the ball forward.
As Barcelona positions their attackers wide, their central area is exposed.
You can begin to anticipate where a game is going early on and what a coach does to change it.
La Liga TV themselves have excellent coverage and managed to capture moments like above to typify Girona’s game plan.
Going wide indicates that Yamal is deeper, and you can use a full-back to push up on him.
Mark the inside midfielder and compact the middle.
It was a brave approach, and Girona didn’t play like a side five points off the bottom, rather the Girona of old that saw them qualify for the Champions League in 2024/2025.
This is evident from this brilliant passage of play above.
Barcelona’s attackers attempted to press them wide in a similar manner to what Girona did to them, but they sneak the ball through and get it wide for a shot inside the box.
Barca have strong pressers in their ranks among attackers, but if you decide to bypass them through quick passing in risky, tight areas, you can start attacking their defence, as most of their attackers are committed forward.
It helped significantly that, at half-time, they were spurred on by Yamal missing a penalty, but when things start to work and come together in a football match, the team begins to believe more and more in their own game plan.
Given that it was a feisty Catalan derby, the stakes were higher, but Girona were always going to play better than their league form suggests in such a fixture.
This also ties into the key ‘game-state’ factors of the match, as Girona scored shortly after Barcelona opened the scoring with a header through Pau Cubarsi.
Barcelona’s High Line
Barca’s high line is a high-risk, high-manoeuvre strategy that has paid off in the past.
Against Girona, some of the weaknesses were clearly exposed.
The problem was that Girona would send balls long and over the top, but that wasn’t the only method they had to score.
In the sequence above, on the left wing, their players managed to dribble the ball up the pitch, and as Barca’s right-back came out to close them down, they still had a high line.
It meant the attacker on the opposite side could stretch them.
Playing with your line so far up the pitch is positive, and it means the attack facing Barca’s defence has to negotiate a way around them whilst Girona are on their own halfway line.
But, because of their neat build-up play, they could drag Barcelona to one side or pull a full-back out whilst reaping the benefits of last season’s champions still playing a high line.
I would say that if the ball is in Barcelona’s half in such a manner, the high line should be abandoned.
Girona were able to drag a defender out, and instead of the line retreating back or marking players, they are forced to stay high because of Flick’s instructions.
The problem becomes exacerbated when you realise how many attackers Barca have thrown forward.
You now have a full-back charging out to get the ball, but another centre-back has to join as a Girona player has also joined in the same zone.
In this instance, the goal was disallowed, but by simply committing three men to attack Barça’s defensive line, you can see the problem it poses.
The striker times his run from deep to get in behind, and then you are relying on your goalkeeper.
Not only are you relying on your defence to constantly keep up their concentration, but you are also tasking your defence with thinking that most of the situations they are in, when in a high line, are ostensible.
Meaning, the defenders are hoping and presuming that the flag will be raised.
It often is, but when the onus is on the opposition to attack and believes they can score, I think a safer approach is needed.
This isn’t to say Flick’s project has stuttered; it’s more a bump in the road, but the fact that they have been well beaten in two matches by Atletico Madrid and now Girona will give the German much food for thought.
Conclusion
When Hansi Flick’s Barcelona tactics work, Barça tend to suffocate opponents and finish them off early.
Against Girona, and recently against Atlético Madrid, the risks attached to their strategy were exposed.
When Barcelona overcommitted in build-up, Girona’s turnovers became launchpads for counterattacks.
The hosts were brave and intelligent when they turned the ball over.
For Barcelona to sustain their title challenge, some tactical evolution may be necessary to stop this from becoming the moment teams learn how to destabilise the Hansi Flick system.
