Celtic begin their UEFA Champions League campaign this week in the play-off round against Kazakhstan Premier League champions Kairat Almaty.
The Hoops will be hoping to at least match their successful run in the competition last season, which saw them progress from the group stage to face Bayern Munich in the knockout phase.
Last term, it took a 94th-minute goal in the Allianz Arena for the German giants to see off the impressive Scottish Premiership Champions.
Throughout their 10 games in last season’s competition, Celtic conceded 17 goals, with only two of the 25 teams that qualified from the group stage conceding more.
However, 11 of those goals came in two games away from home against Borussia Dortmund (7-1) and Aston Villa (4-2).
Following their hammering in Dortmund, Celtic kept three clean sheets in their six remaining group stage matches against Atalanta, Dinamo Zagreb, and BSC Young Boys.
Celtic also scored in all but two of their matches throughout the competition, only failing to find the net away to Atalanta and Dinamo, and tallied a total of 15 goals.
This tactical analysis will analyse Brendan Rodgers tactics, with particular focus on Celtic’s out-of-possession shape in the attacking, middle, and defensive zones of the pitch.
Celtic 4-4-2 High Press
As the above image from RB Leipzig‘s visit to Celtic Park shows, when the ball was in high areas, Celtic pressed aggressively with two forwards in a 4-4-2 shape.
Midfielder Reo Hatate stepped up beside striker Kyogo Furuhashi to create the two.
In this game in particular, Celtic’s press was extremely effective.
It kept the Bundesliga side on the ropes for much of the game and directly resulted in Celtic’s second goal of the match just prior to half-time.
The two forwards’ starting position was narrow to make a pass from the opposition’s goalkeeper into their ‘6’ risky.
This encouraged the first pass to be played to either of the centre-backs who had split on both sides of the goalkeeper.
As soon as the ball was played, the ball-near forward pressed the centre-back from the inside out, sprinting at his inside leg.
This typically left the centre-back with only a predictable pass to his full-back.
The ball-far forward’s role was to prevent a switch of play via the goalkeeper and, as shown in this image, to stop the opposition’s ‘6’ from receiving from his centre-back.
The above image, from a similar play but later in the game, shows the ball-far forward closing in on the goalkeeper to prevent the ball from being switched via the shot stopper.
Here, the trigger for Hatate to become more advanced was the ball being bounced by the opposition’s left-back to his centre-back’s inside foot.
If the opposition broke the first line of pressure, Celtic’s midfield, playing on the front foot, were very aggressive in closing it down and forcing the receiving player to play back to where the ball had come from.
Here, Hatate has jumped to close the goalkeeper in expectation of him receiving a square pass.
Instead, a second Leipzig midfielder has dropped into the ‘6’ position to receive.
The above image shows Callum McGregor, just entering the frame, forcing the ball back where it came from with an angled press that ensures RB Leipzig’s receiving midfielder played back to the corner from where the ball had just arrived.
When the ball was forced backwards, Celtic’s midfield swarmed the zone, ensuring that the area was ring-fenced and that no escape was possible.
The nearest opposition players were man-marked, and there was appropriate pressure put on the ball.
Hatate, again, was positioned to prevent any attempted switch of play from the goalkeeper.
Celtic 4-4-1-1 Mid-Block
When defending slightly deeper in midfield areas when the opposition had comfortable possession, Celtic adopted a 4-4-2 mid-block that adapted to a 4-4-1-1 (shown above) depending on the opposition’s setup.
Here, Bayern Munich are playing with a single pivot, so Hatate has dropped off to man-mark him.
The principles remained the same as when in the final third, with one striker forcing the centre-back to play down one side and the midfield stepping up to get tight to their direct opponent.
What Changes Did Celtic Make To Their Approach?
A key difference in how Celtic defended during their humbling in the Westfalenstadion and their impressive clean sheet in their next match at Atalanta was the level of their backline.
Although in later games the back line was again higher, against Atalanta, the centre-backs were about 10 yards closer to their own goal.
The above image shows the buildup to Borussia Dortmund’s fifth goal, just before half-time.
Here, with no pressure on the ball, Celtic’s deepest players are around 40 yards from their goal.
This allows Dortmund to drop the ball in behind and, as shown, allows a large space for midfield runners.
This scenario meant Celtic’s left-back had to engage the ball, leaving a gap between himself and his nearest centre-back for a midfield runner to burst through.
When the Dortmund winger slid in his midfield runner, the midfielder found himself entering the box one-on-one with Liam Scales.
The midfielder also had two supporting runs being made into the box, with Celtic struggling to get numbers back to defend their goal.
The above image shows Celtic, in a very similar situation, in their next match against Atalanta.
Here, Celtic’s defenders are 10 yards deeper, around 30 yards from their goal.
This positioning makes it much more difficult for the opposition to place a ball behind the backline, making it far more likely that any diagonal will be played in front of them.
With the long diagonal ball being played in front of them, another key difference from the build-up to Dortmund’s goal is who engages the ball.
As can be seen here, it is Celtic’s widest midfield, not the full-back, that presses the opposition’s winger.
This allows the back four to remain intact and retreat towards their own goal as the left midfielder closes down and puts pressure on the ball.
This tactic, and lower positioning of the backline, meant that whenever the opposition managed to get in behind Celtic’s full-backs, Rodgers’ men could easily flood the box.
As can be seen here, just after Atalanta’s wide player has received a long diagonal pass and has dribbled towards the penalty area.
Now, instead of being three on three with space in the box for forwards to attack, Celtic are able to crowd the goal area with nine outfield players in or around the 18-yard box.
The lessons learnt from the Dortmund match were also evident in Celtic’s next visit to Germany.
Here, again, when facing a long diagonal without real pressure on the ball, the back four are 10, as opposed to 20, yards outside of their box.
The difference these 10 yards make when the ball reaches the penalty box is again on show.
Celtic have both a numerical and positional advantage in front of their own goal with little room for Bayern’s superstars to operate.
How Did Aston Villa Break Down Celtic?
Other than Dortmund, Premier League side Aston Villa were another team that provided Celtic with a particularly difficult defensive task.
The Villans took four goals off the Glasgow side and were impressive in how they attacked in the wide areas.
The above image shows Celtic in their 4-4-2 mid- to low block moments before Aston Villa scored their opening goal.
Right-back Alistair Johnston is being pinned by winger Jacob Ramsey.
Ramsey, who has recently signed for Villa’s Premier League rivals Newcastle United, then made a movement towards the ball just as his left back, Lucas Digne, made a forward run in behind.
Ramsey made several runs in this move, all of which were tracked closely by Johnston.
In this scenario, the issue for Johnston is that Nicolas Kühn, Celtic’s widest midfielder (highlighted), who is zonally positioned, cannot drop with Aston Villa’s left-back, who is making a run in behind from deep.
Aston Villa’s centre-back then played a simple chipped pass to his left-back, and Villa were in behind.
Whilst this run proceeded, Celtic never recovered their positioning after a few more passes in the lead-up to the goal.
Ramsey went on to receive the ball and cut it back to attacking midfielder Morgan Rogers, who slammed the ball past Kasper Schmeichel just a few seconds later.
Conclusion
Whilst there were slight changes in certain games, such as a slightly deeper backline against Atalanta, Celtic persevered with the same principles and basic shape throughout their time in the competition.
It is a testament to the coaching of Rodgers that Celtic were able to bounce back from a 7-1 drubbing from Dortmund and only once more conceded over two goals in a game.
Although Aston Villa provided another stern test, Celtic learned from these two defeats and, in the end, were extremely unlucky not to take another big hitter in Bayern Munich to extra time.
With left-back Kieran Tierney having rejoined the club and most of the current side having experienced last season’s campaign, Rodgers will be optimistic of another successful group stage campaign should they survive the playoff round.
