The meetings between Germany and the Netherlands on the football pitch have always been exciting. Yet again, we witnessed another great show by the two teams as the Oranje took on the 2014 World Cup winners after an interesting twist in their performance in the Euro 2020 qualifiers.
As the scoreline shows, Germany dominated the first half, although they lacked good finishing, which deprived them of a greater advantage at half-time. The Netherlands’ continuous efforts, and a change in their plan, were rewarded by them equalising and taking control of the game to finish as the winners with a 4-2 scoreline.
Games between these two teams are often the opposite of what you would expect. This time Joachim Löw’s tactics forced Ronald Koeman to change his team’s strategy in-game, and it worked out perfectly for them.
In this tactical analysis, we will take an in-depth look at both teams tactics. We’ll use analysis to see what went wrong for Germany and how Koeman found a solution to the intense pressure.
Lineups
Löw lined up Germany in a 3-4-2-1 formation in possession with an intention to fit their opponents’ strategy. Manuel Neuer was his first choice for the goalkeeping spot once again. In the defensive third, the coach relied on Jonathan Tah, Niklas Süle and Matthias Ginter. Nico Schulz and Lukas Klostermann were in the role of wing-backs, with Schulz supporting the attacking actions, whilst Klostermann would focus on his defensive responsibilities. In the heart of the team, Toni Kroos and Joshua Kimmich formed a dangerous duo, being responsible for distributing the ball further. The forward line, which caused a lot of trouble to one of the best defenders in the world right now was formed by Timo Werner, Marco Reus and Serge Gnabry.
Koeman used some varieties of the 3-5-2 scheme, going from 3-1-4-2 to 3-4-1-2 in different phases of the game. On the goal, he had Jasper Cillessen, right behind the defensive trio of Daley Blind, Virgil van Dijk and Matthijs de Ligt. Unexpectedly, the underrated Blind pulled out a strong performance and managed to keep his side safe as well as help in their forward actions. Frenkie de Jong was acting as a pivot in the defensive midfield, having Quincy Promes and Denzel Dumfries on the wings. What was more interesting is that they didn’t have much of a wing-backs role, which is typical when the teams are defending with a back three. In the centre of the pitch were operating Marten de Roon and Georginio Wijnaldum, who would turn as one of the best performers in the second half. To finish off their attack, Koeman chose Memphis Depay and Ryan Babel.
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