Borussia Dortmund Vs Barcelona [3-1] – Champions League Quarter-Final Second Leg 2024/2025 – Tactical Analysis

Borussia Dortmund may have been knocked out of the Champions League by FC Barcelona in the quarter-finals this season.

However, Dortmund showed the world something in the second leg at Signal Iduna Park.

They showed how Barcelona can be beaten, shutting down Hansi Flick’s attack and hitting back efficiently.

Dortmund won 3-1, with Serhou Guirassy‘s hat-trick only cancelled out by Ramy Bensebaini‘s own goal.

Yes, Barcelona won the first leg 4-0, which might have made the game seem one-sided.

Tactically speaking, what happened on the pitch showed that Barcelona really couldn’t do much.

They scored just one goal in the first half, and in total, their expected goal ratio (xG) is just 0.49.

It was a terrible performance from Barcelona.

This tactical analysis will explain how Niko Kovač‘s Dortmund successfully shut down Barcelona in this game.

You can also listen to our analysis on the Total Football Analysis Podcast!

Man-To-Man Press Vs Barcelona‘s Build-Up

Right from the start, Dortmund used a man-to-man approach against Barcelona’s build-up.

They ensured that all their passing options were covered, so Barcelona didn’t have a chance to advance the ball.

Barcelona’s problem was that their goalkeeper, Wojciech Szczesny, couldn’t really be a plus one in the build-up.

Then Dortmund used him as a target.

With no passing options, Szczesny often opted to play the long ball.

But it wasn’t really effective.

He attempted 13 long balls on the night, but only three were successful.

Ronald Araujo also struggled as a distributor.

None of his long balls found the target, and his overall passing accuracy was just under 80%.

Pau Cubarsi, on the other hand, was better, so Barcelona preferred to attack through him.

This made Barcelona’s build-up more predictable, as Dortmund knew where they were going.

For example, in the build-up some minutes before Dortmund got the penalty, Barcelona lost possession on the left when Niklas Süle intercepted Gerard Martin‘s pass to Raphinha.

Another problem was that Gavi sometimes positioned himself too high, leaving him far away from the back four.

So when Barcelona wanted to move forward and use the central midfielder as another option, Gavi was too late to offer his body.

Hansi Flick tried to rectify the situation in the second half by bringing on Pedri and Eric Garcia to help the build-up, and replacing Gavi.

However, it didn’t help much.

Yes, Barcelona had the goal and the chances in the second half, but there was no real danger.

Minimising Barcelona‘s Fast Attack By Closing The Free Space

Dortmund successfully minimised Barcelona’s attack by disrupting the build-up with a man-to-man approach.

However, when Barcelona’s build-up was successful in getting into Dortmund’s half or the final third, Dortmund weren’t as aggressive.

They preferred to fall back as a group, forming a 5-4-1 or 5-3-2 block.

The focus was on minimising Barcelona’s pass to the free space and keeping as many players in the box as possible when Barcelona entered the final third.

Dortmund learned from the first leg, when they played a back four and left plenty of space in and in front of the box for Barcelona to exploit.

So Niko Kovac’s focus for the return leg will be to keep his side outnumbered and limit the space Barcelona can run into.

The gap between the lines wasn’t going to be too wide, and if a player was jumping to press his marker, there would be plenty of body to cover the space.

And it worked perfectly to limit Barcelona’s pace, which also limited the quality of their chances.

Serhou Guirassy As An Additional Body During The Build-Up

Serhou Guirassy scored a hat-trick and showed his class in the penalty area.

That wasn’t the only highlight of his superb performance against Barcelona in the second leg.

During Dortmund’s build-up, Kovac instructed the striker to drop back and provide an additional passing option.

Often, Guirassy would drop back into his own half.

There were several reasons for this.

Firstly, Kovac seemed to want to use Guirassy as a wall.

When he received the ball, he kept it or held it and passed it to the player who made a progressive run so that Dortmund could attack.

He also dropped to create space in the Barcelona defence, especially behind the defensive line.

When Guirassy dropped, he needed to be followed by another player, and Dortmund were able to create a situation where they were outnumbered.

Or, when he dropped, Dortmund successfully created a dilemma for Barcelona’s centre-backs.

They had two options: Stay on the line and follow him.

Most of the time, they stayed on the line, but they concentrated on marking Dortmund’s wide strikers, who played narrowly and ran into space.

Barcelona’s centre-backs were often caught out by the speed or disorganised in this who-follows-who situation.

And Dortmund successfully attacked the space created by those kinds of situations.

Serhou Guirassy Touch Map

Dortmund Narrow Forwards Were The Key

As mentioned earlier, Dortmund’s wide striker played narrowly and often ran into space, forcing the Barcelona defence into a dilemma.

One key success of Niko Kovac’s tactics in the second leg was telling Karim Adeyemi and Maximilian Beier to play narrow as wide forwards or wingers rather than wide.

This created several problems for Barcelona during the game.

Firstly, it created a dilemma not only for the centre-backs but also for Barcelona’s full-backs.

Because Adeyemi and Beier were supposed to be marking them, their positioning, which was often close to the centre, made Martin and Joules Kounde play tight as well.

This tightened up Barcelona’s defence in general and created space on both flanks.

Dortmund’s wing-backs, Daniel Svensson and Yan Couto, took advantage of this.

Both had plenty of space to run into and were often unmarked as Barcelona’s wingers concentrated on playing tight to mark Dortmund’s centre-backs in the build-up.

As a result, Dortmund were often able to take advantage by leaving their wing-backs free on the flanks and attacking through this zone.

In this situation, they were able to outsmart Barcelona’s offside trap, too.

By moving the ball to the flank first, they knew they could drop Barcelona’s defensive line before sending it to the forwards.

Secondly, by narrowing down their wide forward play, Dortmund were also able to create space between Barcelona’s defenders.

With Guirassy, it sounds like they had a 3v4 situation, but in fact, they dominated the channel or space between the players, and they also had two big spaces on either flank, which were maximised by the wing-backs.

Dortmund often had a 5v4 situation against Barcelona’s defensive line, and they successfully launched various attacks from this situation.

That’s why they were able to attack in space, create chances, and score goals.

Conclusion

Dortmund lost, and the aggregate score of 3-5 sounds bad.

Yes, the first leg was terrible for them—they made so many mistakes and were easily exploited and outsmarted by Barcelona.

But they learnt from their mistakes and in the second leg, they showed the world how to really beat Barcelona.

They consistently created dangerous attacks and had 2.09 xG from open play.

Niko Kovac outsmarted his former assistant Hansi Flick in several situations.

First, they successfully disrupted Barcelona’s build-up with man-marking and limited the space for Barcelona to attack with a five-man defence.

Then, in possession, Kovac used Guirassy to create space and another body in the build-up, as he wanted the wide forwards to play narrowly.

This combination gave Dortmund plenty of space to attack, especially on the flank and behind Barcelona’s defensive line, and it ultimately helped them to victory.

Barcelona will face the stronger team in the semi-final, either Inter or Bayern Munich, but they must also learn from their mistakes in this game.

Otherwise, any club can learn from what Dortmund have just done.