Following Ruben Amorim’s departure, Michael Carrick has returned as Manchester United head coach until the end of the 2025/26 season. It is his second spell in charge after a three-game caretaker stint in 2021, and follows nearly three seasons as Middlesbrough head coach. Carrick’s work at Middlesbrough offers a clear reference point for assessing how a possession-focused 4-2-3-1 could shape United’s tactical structure heading into the 2026-27 campaign.
Appointed by Middlesbrough in October 2022, Carrick took the club from one point above the relegation zone to fourth by the end of that season, before a playoff semi-final defeat to Coventry City. Middlesbrough then reached the EFL Cup semi-finals in his second season, finished eighth in the Championship and subsequently placed 10th in his final campaign. Across that period, he developed a style built on short-passing connections, patient construction and central numerical superiority.
The Structural Shift: From a Back Three to a Flexible 4-2-3-1
At Middlesbrough, Carrick preferred a 4-2-3-1, with occasional use of a 4-4-2. The approach differed from the back-three structures used before his appointment and quickly established a short-passing style focused on central control. In his three seasons in charge, Middlesbrough ranked third, fifth and third in the Championship for total passes, with similar rankings for passes per minute in possession. Even with an average possession share of 51.7 per cent in 2023-24, the team maintained a high passing volume through close-quarter connections.
A Back to Carrington tactical analysis describes United using a 4-2-3-1 framework that becomes a 3-2-5 in possession. In that analysis, one full-back moves inside or remains deep to help create a three-player base, while the wingers stay high and wide. The resulting structure is intended to provide options through the first line of pressure while maintaining cover behind the ball.
That flexibility can create multiple passing angles through central areas and retain a clearer rest-defence against counter-attacks. High and wide players can also pin opposing full-backs back, creating space between defensive and midfield lines for players receiving forward passes.
Build-Up Geometry and Central Dominance Through the Double Pivot
The double pivot was central to Carrick’s Middlesbrough build-up. Positioned ahead of the centre-backs, the two midfielders connected frequently with the defensive line through short bounce passes designed to manipulate the first press or a mid-block. Full-backs initially held their positions before releasing later, while the team used significant numbers in central spaces to progress through frequent short combinations.
The scale of that reliance was reflected in Middlesbrough’s passing distribution. In 2024-25, Hayden Hackney and Aidan Morris combined for 22 per cent of the team’s total Championship passes. Jonny Howson and Daniel Barlaser accounted for 17 per cent in 2023-24.
According to the Back to Carrington analysis, United’s double pivot consists of Casemiro and Kobbie Mainoo, operating ahead of Lisandro Martínez and Harry Maguire. The analysis says the midfield pair exchange short passes with the centre-backs to draw opponents out and create forward-passing lanes. It also identifies the double pivot as the heart of United’s current structure.
Carrick’s Middlesbrough frequently added a fourth central player to support the double pivot. One winger, typically Finn Azaz, moved inside early to join the midfield and create two fluid central attackers ahead of the more fixed pair. This produced four-player combinations in midfield and gave the side further options for bounce passes and short connections. The Back to Carrington analysis similarly observes Matheus Cunha moving inside from the left at United to create an additional central presence, while Bruno Fernandes operates between the lines.
Final-Third Penetration and Low-Block Bottlenecks
In the final third, Middlesbrough continued to prioritise short connections rather than hopeful deliveries into the box. Across two of Carrick’s three seasons, the club ranked first and second in the Championship for deep completions, defined as passes targeting spaces within roughly 20 metres of the opposition goal. They also ranked second twice for touches in the opposition penalty area.
Narrow wingers, the number 10 and advancing full-backs combined to create routes into the box. The centre-forward’s runs in behind could push the opposition back line deeper, opening space between the lines, while full-backs supplied width after a winger had moved inside. As Carrick’s Middlesbrough tenure progressed, the side increasingly used narrow attacking-midfield combinations and incisive passing rather than relying on frequent crosses.
Patient possession can nevertheless become ineffective against compact low blocks. When opponents keep large numbers around the penalty area, central spaces can close and side-to-side circulation can become harmless. The Back to Carrington analysis identifies this as a current issue for United, describing a match against West Ham in which a deep block forced play wide and restricted space between the lines.
That analysis proposes several possible responses: using Benjamin Šeško as an aerial target when crosses are required, moving Mainoo higher into a 4-1-4-1 shape alongside Fernandes, and switching play more quickly before a defence can reorganise. These are analytical suggestions rather than established features of United’s structure.
Defensive Rest-Structure and Mid-Block Pressing Traps
Without the ball, Carrick’s Middlesbrough were not consistently a high-pressing team. They did not finish among the Championship’s top 10 sides for Passes Per Defensive Action in any of his three seasons, and recorded the division’s lowest challenge-intensity metric in 2024-25. Instead, Carrick commonly used a disciplined 4-2-3-1 mid-block that could become a 4-4-1-1 or 4-4-2.
The front players could operate as a flat pair screening the centre, or as a staggered pair, with the number nine locking play in one direction and the number 10 marking the deepest central midfielder. Wide players then supported the block by pressing outward to force play around the outside or inward towards central pressure. When a winger pressed outward, the near full-back could step higher and the closest member of the double pivot moved into the inside channel to prevent a reverse pass.
The Back to Carrington analysis describes comparable principles in United’s out-of-possession shape. It says Bruno Fernandes moves alongside the striker to screen the pivot and direct play wide, while the wingers form a midfield line of four. The analysis also describes flank-based pressing traps in which a winger presses outward, the full-back advances and the double pivot shifts across to block the inside pass.
At Middlesbrough, if the team dropped into a deeper block, the shape converted into a 4-4-1-1 or 4-4-2. The objective was to show and keep the ball on the sides, with the double pivot deep in support of the centre-backs. This could allow access back inside at times, but it kept the ball ahead of the back line and central midfield for longer periods.
Analytical Verdict: Blueprint for the 2026-27 Season
Carrick’s Middlesbrough record points to a coherent tactical model: a back four, a double pivot, central overloads, short passing and a measured mid-block. The supplementary analysis of United suggests elements of the same model are being adapted at Old Trafford through a 4-2-3-1 that can become a 3-2-5 in possession.
The key tactical question is whether that structure can retain its control while finding more effective solutions against compact defences. Carrick’s established emphasis on central combinations and defensive organisation provides a useful framework, while the low-block issues identified in the supplementary analysis underline the adjustments that may be required for a sustainable United structure in 2026-27.
