The most interesting tactical battle between coaches took place once again at the Etihad Stadium on Sunday evening, as Manchester City hosted Liverpool in the Premier League. The battle between Guardiola and Klopp is by no means a new one, nor is it an unfamiliar one, and these games have often followed a tactical pattern through the years; however this most recent game included a tactical change which led to an even more interesting match. The match ultimately came down to the pressing of both sides, and this had the most impact on the game on a general level, and both sides performed well in this regard to see the match end in a draw. In this tactical analysis, we will discuss the change in tactics employed by Jürgen Klopp and how this impacted the game, as well as looking at how Manchester City looked to exploit this and limit it through their own pressing.
Lineups
The big talking point when the lineups came out was Liverpools inclusion of both Diogo Jota and Roberto Firmino alongside Mohamed Salah and Sadio Mané. This left the question of would these players line up in a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-4-2, and as we can see below Klopp opted for a 4-4-2, which is a formation he has rarely used at Liverpool but one that he often used at Borussia Dortmund. Manchester City lined up in a 4-2-3-1, with Gabriel Jesus available to start up front.

Liverpools pressing controls Citys build-up
The use of this 4-4-2 by Liverpool proved to be very effective in the game, particularly in the first half, where their pressing scheme was able to limit Citys build-up and cause their positional play to stagnate. We can see the structure of both teams below, with City dropping into a 4-3-3 while Liverpool use their 4-4-2. We can see the roles and responsibilities of each player clearly also.
The two strikers aimed to press the centre-backs while cutting access to the pivot(s) using their cover shadows. While City were in a single pivot, the role would fall mainly to Roberto Firmino to cut access into Rodri, and so he would apply only light pressure to his nearest centre-back and instead would consistently scan for Rodri in order to keep him covered. The wingers pressed the Man City full-backs, and would initially protect the half-space before doing so. The ball-near midfielder, in this case, Gini Wijnaldum, was responsible for covering the half-space, and so they would consistently move from side to side in order to occupy this lane and prevent the ball going through it. The far midfielder (Henderson here) was tasked with the responsibility of maintaining central compactness, and so again he would shuffle from side to side repetitively and prevent a pass going through the two midfielders where possible.


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