Tottenham Hotspur Vs Manchester United [1-0] – UEFA Europa League Final 2024/2025 – Tactical Analysis

Tottenham Hotspur have lifted the UEFA Europa League trophy following a 1-0 win over Manchester United.

In addition to the silverware, this win grants Tottenham participation in next season’s UEFA Champions League despite finishing in the 17th spot in the Premier League—a remarkable achievement for the team this season.

In fact, they broke the record of the teams winning European trophies while holding poor spots in their league standings since no team has ever won a European trophy while being 17th in their own league.

On the other hand, Manchester United suffered yet another excruciating defeat, deepening their continuous crisis under Ruben Amorim.

They finished the Premier League season in 16th spot and, obviously, will not participate in Europe next season.

This tactical analysis article will cover the match from two angles: exploring Tottenham’s defensive organisation under Ange Postecoglou tactics, how Spurs managed to limit Man United’s threats, and identifying Manchester United’s playmaking and attacking issues.

Tottenham & Manchester United Lineups & Formations

Ange Postecoglou started the match with his Spurs side in a 4-3-3 formation, with Guglielmo Vicario as a goalkeeper, Pedro Porro, Cristian Romero, Micky van de Ven, and Destiny Udogie in defence.

The midfield was formed of three central midfielders: Yves Bissouma, Rodrigo Bentancur, and Pape Matar Sarr.

This helped Tottenham have a powerful, physical yet very technical and intelligent midfield trio.

Sarr even played as an advanced playmaker at certain times in the offensive phase, retreating to the same line of the trio after losing the ball.

This helped Tottenham have more opportunities to keep possession inside the final third while not losing the numerical advantage when defending.

In attack, Postecoglou surprised most followers by using Richarlison from the beginning instead of Son Heung-min, who was expected to start this match.

That change appeared to benefit Richarlison and the team, who changed the rhythm whenever he wanted, retreated to help in the defensive phase whenever needed, provided accurate long and short passes, and was involved in almost all of Tottenham’s attacking attempts.

Brennan Johnson was used as a right-winger, and the team’s striker was Dominic Solanke.

Ruben Amorim opted for his preferred 3-4-2-1 formation for the Red Devils, with André Onana as a goalkeeper and Harry Maguire, Leny Yoro, and Luke Shaw as centre-backs.

Although Amorim’s choice to rely on Shaw’s experience in such a tense game is understandable, we must say that using a slow defender in a match like this and against a winger like Johnson, knowing that he also had to cover for Solanke’s movements, seems like a risky decision by Amorim.

In fact, it was easy to notice that Shaw was not at his best.

His slow movements and decision-making impacted Manchester United’s possession average, ball losses in their own half, and counter-attacking risks.

Victor Lindelöf, who is used to playing in that position in a back-three defence, would have been a more suitable choice for this match’s circumstances.

More importantly, he has a natural centre-back profile and defends better than Shaw.

In midfield, playing with Bruno Fernandes and Casemiro was not the best midfield duo to opt for in such a game.

It is true that both players have the experience needed to play such games.

However, Fernandes cannot give 100% of his abilities when playing as a central midfielder, and the team loses a large part of his playmaking contribution in this way, in addition to losing the defensive addition that another pure central midfielder would offer.

Therefore, keeping Fernandes in an advanced playmaker position and opting for Manuel Ugarte or Kobbie Mainoo as a central midfielder along with Casemiro would have guaranteed the needed balance in Manchester United’s midfield.

It would have helped them secure their defence further and create more chances upfront with Fernandes playing inside the final third.

Another surprising decision was to use Mason Mount from the start, even though the player is not in his best form at the moment.

This was done while keeping a fresh winger like Alejandro Garnacho on the bench and using him only starting from the 71st minute.

Despite that, Garnacho was able to make the difference for Manchester United during the last minutes of the game.

His agility and dribbling skills created a real danger for Tottenham’s defence, which confirmed the wrong choice of using Mount from the start.

He lacked the pace and agility needed to beat Porro in one-on-one situations.

Amorim used both Noussair Mazraoui and Patrick Dorgu as wing-backs, with Amad Diallo leaning towards the right wing so often and playing on the same line with Mount, behind the main striker Rasmus Højlund, who Joshua Zirkzee then replaced.

Given both strikers’ performance in this match, it is fair to say that Zirkzee deserved even more time during this match as he disturbed Tottenham’s defence in the little time he got more than Højlund did in the 71 minutes he played.

Zirkzee was more aggressive in duels and tried to fight on every half opportunity he got, unlike those who did not really provide the needed depth in Tottenham’s box, nor did they create dangerous opportunities for themselves or their teammates.

Manchester United Final Pass & Finishing Issues

No one can deny that Manchester United’s results and performances are disappointing and worrying.

Despite the potential and value of many of the players, Manchester United’s attacking playing style always lacks a kind of misconnection, especially inside the final third.

The most crucial mistake in this match was the reliance on a creative attacking midfielder like Fernandes in a position that limited his playmaking potential and obliged him to commit more to defensive duties rather than having more freedom to advance, provide key passes, or aim at shooting.

Bruno Fernandes Midfield Ball Losses 

More importantly, playing Fernandes in that part of midfield led to conceding counter-attacks.

Fernandes’s passing mistakes are less dangerous when committed inside the opponent’s final third and obviously much more dangerous when losing the ball in central midfield.

These ball losses made things more complicated for Manchester United since one of them was the direct cause of the counter-attacking action that led to the game’s single goal.

The picture above highlights in white the position that Fernandes should hold and in red the position that he actually held before providing a poor pass that allowed Bissouma to exploit the space behind Fernandes.

Being unaware of the danger of providing such a wrong pass in that area is partly due to the lack of experience and of traits that allow him to play in that central/defensive midfield position.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that everyone on the team during this final, including Fernandes, Diallo, Højlund, and Mount, made poor decisions, whose impact was not tangible in this game.

The way both Højlund and Fernandes dealt with the following chance in the first half explains how hesitant and confident Manchester United’s players were during this match, especially in terms of finishing.

With the exception of Diallo and Garnacho, who were both very determined to create, whether in terms of penetrations, dribbling, crosses, or shots, the rest lacked that extra ambition and quick and efficient decision-making in terms of finishing.

Rasmus Højlund Final Pass Decision-Making

In this action, Højlund was good enough in anticipating Vicario’s movement to the ball and was successful in winning it near the corner line.

However, he was not good enough in his passing decisions.

He could have raised his head before reaching the ball to notice Mount, who was unmarked in front of an empty goal.

Therefore, a cross towards Mount would have converted this action into a goal.

Instead, Højlund went for the most obvious solution and passed the ball to Fernandes, who was near him.

Likewise, Fernandes’ inability to anticipate his teammate’s movements and make a decision before receiving the ball complicated things for himself and the success rate of the action.

In other words, scanning the pitch to identify the best possible passing solution before receiving the ball would have enabled Fernandes to provide the pass as soon as he received it, not control it and then start thinking of a passing solution as he did.

In important games like the UEFA Europa League finals, the difference between average and world-class playmakers lies in details like anticipating defenders’ actions, scanning the pitch beforehand, and being extremely quick yet crucial in decision-making, especially in key areas.

Bruno Fernandes Final Pass Decision-Making

So in this action, avoiding the control and providing the cross directly would have spared Fernandes the burden of having to dribble past one of the defenders and resisting the other before being able to pass the ball when the surprise element is already gone and the goalkeeper has already got back to his goal.

It is true that later in the match, Manchester United found some attacking solutions.

The overlaps of Mazraoui behind Diallo created numerical superiority on the right wing, and early crosses (especially following the substitution of Diogo Dalot) were attempted in addition to the crosses and penetrations of Garnacho from the left side.

But despite that, the finishing touch was the aspect that made things complicated for Manchester United in this game and prevented them from equalising.

Manchester United created a few dangerous chances in the second half, though most of them involved crossing.

In some of these chances, Tottenham’s defence was unbalanced, and some players were unmarked during crosses.

Nevertheless, Manchester United did not exploit these marking mistakes and failed to finish inside the net due to a lack of quality at times and Vicario’s saves at other times.

Manchester United Finishing Issue

The example we chose highlights Tottenham’s few marking mistakes despite their solid defending throughout the match and highlights how Manchester United were unable to score even during such inviting situations.

During this Mazraoui cross, three Manchester United players were unmarked and asked for the ball.

However, Fernandes received the cross on the near post and directed his header away from goal in a strange way.

Tottenham Defensive Resistance & The Impact Of The 5-4-1 Formation

Although some mistakes could have led to conceding goals, Tottenham’s defensive performance was good enough to help them win the match despite suffering on some occasions.

The high pressing applied in most of the match periods was very effective, and the role of the three midfielders in that high pressing was very valuable, knowing that Bissouma’s pressing was the direct reason that Tottenham initiated its goal action.

More importantly, knowing exactly when to make the needed defensive alterations and reacting quickly to Manchester United’s substitution of Garnacho and Zirkzee by switching to the 5-4-1 formation and replacing Johnson with an additional centre-back, Kevin Danso, was definitely a very useful and intelligent move by Postecoglou at a crucial time.

Tottenham Change To The 5-4-1 Formation

That tactical change helped Tottenham defend better, whether during crosses or set-pieces when closing down players or shooting trajectories.

It allowed the team to have a narrow defensive line throughout the last 15 minutes.

The change to the 5-4-1 formation obliged Manchester United to get fewer spaces inside the box and to have fewer chances to penetrate from the wings, which is precisely why we saw them resort to early crosses as soon as they got to the wings.

The next picture showcases this defensive organisation, which was narrowed and centred around the box mainly, while always leaving one of the wingers unmarked, as seen in this case with Garnacho at the top of the picture.

Leaving him unmarked on purpose and condensing the players in the middle of the pitch instead meant that the idea was to push Manchester United to the wings.

Tottenham Organisation Of Their Two Lines Of Defence

It was very risky for Manchester United players to go for passes to the middle, and their only solution was to circulate the ball from wing to wing while trying to find a positional mistake from Tottenham’s defence.

This was made even more complicated with the very close distance between the two lines of defence, leaving very little space for the receiver of the ball in that area to control or pass the ball without problems.

Tottenham Wing Defending

Moreover, each time Garnacho or Diallo tried to fix a player in an attempt to dribble past him or cut inside, three Tottenham players encountered him to win the duel even when both of them were supported by one or two teammates providing passing options.

Although this was not applied throughout the game, but only in the last part of it, it was an efficient way to limit the wingers’ threat and oblige them to resort to crosses, which obviously suited Tottenham more than penetrating to the box.

Conclusion

Tottenham were the better side in this match, mainly because they were more balanced and eager to win.

They also made the right decisions at the appropriate times, whether in terms of defending, high pressing, attacking, or changing formation.

That’s why Tottenham deserve to win the trophy even though the difference between the two teams is not that huge.

On the other hand, Manchester United did their best to win.

Still, they were not able to do so for various reasons, including an unconvincing starting lineup, late attacking changes, lack of accuracy in terms of finishing and final passes, and a few fatal defensive mistakes.