Having won the Swiss Super League title by 31 points during the 2020/21 season, BSC Young Boys manager Gerardo Seoane was snatched up by one of the Bundesliga’s most historical and exciting clubs – Bayer Leverkusen.
Unsurprisingly, the former head coach was taken to a top-five league.
It became almost inevitable during his reign due to the exciting brand of football on display at the Wankdorf Stadium and the success that ensued, lifting three league titles consecutively in just as much time.
Seoane was always going to be a tough act to follow.
Still, given the gargantuan points difference between Young Boys and second-placed FC Basel, nobody would’ve expected such a worrying drop-off in just one season.
The former Huddersfield and Schalke boss David Wagner was handed the reins, but by the time of his dismissal in March, the champions were 15 points adrift of FC Zürich.
His permanent replacement was the former Basel manager Raphaël Wicky, who was most famous for beating José Mourinho’s Manchester United and Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City in the same UEFA Champions League campaign in 2017/18.
Wicky has completely turned it around in the current season, as Young Boys sit top of the table by 15 points, boasting the best attack and defence in the division by a considerable margin.
In this tactical analysis piece, we will take a look at Raphaël Wicky tactics he is using in Bern to guide the Swiss giants back to the top.
BSC Young Boys Formation
Throughout his tenure at the Wankdorf Stadium, Seoane advocated for the 4-4-2.
According to Wyscout, the conventional structure was the most utilised shape during his reign in Bern.
Out of possession is where this showed the most.
Once Wagner took charge of the three-peat champions, he wasn’t going to be the one to shake things up drastically.
The American-Germans maintained their faith in the 4-4-2, which was used in 63 percent of Young Boys’ matches during the 2021/22 campaign.
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
It wasn’t broken when Seoane left, but it certainly was by the day of Wagner’s dismissal.
Upon arrival at the club, interim boss Matteo Vanetta continued with the 4-4-2, which had mixed results.
A few wins, a few draws and some defeats, but it was always going to be tough to stop the team from bleeding with just 11 games of the season remaining.
Then, Wicky came in.
The former Chicago Fire boss suffered some squad losses, including the experienced Miralem Sulejmani, Michel Aebischer, Jordan Lefort, Wilfried Kanga, Theoson Siebatcheu, and Christopher Martins Pereira.
However, his signings were intelligent, astute, and sensible.
He brought in Rangers’ Cedric Itten, Servette FC’s Kastriot Imeri, and Filip Ugrinic from FC Luzern while also regaining the services of Jean-Pierre Nsame from his loan.
The squad was bolstered, and, unsurprisingly, the shape changed.
Wicky moved to a diamond, which was a bold but intriguing choice.
Not many top sides use a diamond in midfield anymore, so it was quite a refreshing change from his predecessors.
Sometimes, the shape is a 4-4-2 diamond, but on other occasions, it resembles more of a 4-1-3-2 or a 4-3-1-2 formation.
But let’s not get bogged down in these details, which are simply situational and depend on where the opposition’s midfielders are.
Nevertheless, despite being such a dominant team in Switzerland this season, BSC Young Boys’ pizza chart makes for interesting reading.
While Wicky wants his side to dominate possession, this is clearly not the be-all and end-all of his football philosophy.
They are not even in the top 90 percent in many attacking metrics apart from two, including the one that matters the most – goals!
Nevertheless, they do rank incredibly high in metrics out of possession, alluding to Young Boys being a very intense and energetic team when defending.
But more on this later in this team scout report.
Essentially, there is lots of pressing, plenty of crosses and an abundance of goals.
It’s a little more niche than that, but we’ll break it down as best we can.
Defending in a diamond
There are several disadvantages to playing with a 4-4-2 diamond shape, particularly the overreliance on the fullbacks and the wide central midfielders to do much of the heavy lifting.
Given the nature of the narrow midfield, the fullbacks are the sole providers of width and have quite a lot of ground to cover up and down the flanks.
Meanwhile, the wide central midfielders are tasked with getting across to the wide areas to ensure that the opposition does not overload the fullbacks.
This is especially trivial if the attacking side constantly switch the play.
And yes, Young Boys suffer from both of these issues.
However, every shape has both upsides and downsides.
There are also massive benefits to using a 4-4-2 diamond when pressing the opposition high up the pitch.
But first, let’s perform an analysis of Wicky’s structure.
This is quite a rudimentary position for Young Boys when pressing against a back four with one pivot in front.
The strikers mark the centre-backs; the number ‘10’ takes the opponent’s ‘6’ or deepest-lying midfielder.
The wide central midfielders have an important role that is completely situational.
Depending on which fullback from the opposition receives the ball, the nearest central midfielder will push up to press them while the other tucks inside to offer balance.
The players closest to the ball all man-mark an opponent, trying to regain possession using the sidelines as an extra man.
In many coaching circles, this process is normally known as ‘locking on’.
Even the pivot – the player that notoriously protects the backline in these moments – steps across and marks any free players that could be a potential get-out-of-jail-free card for the opposition to bypass the press.
The backline pushes up in unison with the rest of the defensive block, positioning itself right at the halfway line, attempting to limit the space between itself and the midfield.
This is evident from the average defensive line height of Young Boys’ defence this season, which is practically at the halfway mark.
What is also noticeable is just how many defensive actions there have been in the opposition’s half of the pitch,h too.
Let’s scrutinise this in closer detail.
In the Swiss Super League, the champions-elect have registered 299 high regains in the opposition’s half, 470 counter-pressing recoveries and 122 dangerous recoveries.
Furthermore, 29 of these ball recoveries have come in the 18-yard box.
The 4-4-2 diamond set-up out of possession is almost tailor-made for playing in transition.
That’s not to say Young Boys always play on the counterattack, but merely that they can.
Ole Gunnar Solskjaer similarly used the shape during his interim spell at Manchester United, during which the Red Devils put together an insane run of form.
Essentially, once United won the ball, the two strikers split wide—rather uncreatively labelled split-strikers—and hit the channels between the opposition’s fullbacks and central defenders.
Marcus Rashford and Anthony Martial were operating as the split strikers, and Jesse Lingard was sitting behind them in the hole.
Man United won the ball deep in their own half, and Rashford and Martial began running down the sides of the centre-backs due to Spurs’ fullbacks being caught out of position.
In the end, Paul Pogba lofted the ball through to Rashford, who scored the game’s only goal to pick up a massive three points for Solskjaer’s men.
Young Boys’ counterattack is similar to this.
As soon as possession is won, the two centre-forwards spread out and hit the channels.
The idea is to be quick and preferably hit the first pass forward to the strikers.
Having players like Nsame, Meschak Elia, or Itten at their disposal makes Young Boys extremely dangerous on the break.
Getting back to the side’s pressing for a moment, Wicky’s team is really positive in their approach.
They look to win the ball as close to the opposition’s goal as possible to create opportunities, potentially.
But some risks come with this.
Since the Swiss coach pulls his entire midfield to the ball side and instructs them to lock on, the backline is not protected.
Normally, the pivot would sit a little deeper to protect the backline from balls played over the press.
However, when the number ‘6’ is really high up the pitch, supporting the press, nobody is doing this job and the space between the centre-backs and the midfield is stretched.
Here, the front six are all inside the final third.
There is no protection for the backline, so the defenders are forced to be aggressive in their duels, man-marking and following their men into deeper areas.
It could be pretty straightforward for the opposition to lob the ball into their forwards, take on one of the defenders and get in behind.
Regardless, it’s part and parcel of being a risky side in and out of possession, and the biggest risk you can take is not to take any risk at all.
Now, onto Young Boys’ tactics in possession.
Use of the goalkeeper
Risk plays a significant role in Young Boys’ defensive strategies and is also evident when the Swiss Super League leaders are in possession of the ball.
The side’s structure when building attacks is one of the most intriguing components of their game model.
Like many teams, Wicky wants to create a plus-one situation at the back against the opposition’s first line of pressure.
For instance, if the other team are defending with two men up top, Young Boys will ensure three players are under the ball, forming a 3v2.
It doesn’t always have to be with three players, though.
Young Boys will have numerical superiority with the two centre-backs if their opponents are defending with just one striker.
However, many teams in the modern game defend with a front two, particularly while pressing.
This means that Young Boys have to find ways to ensure they have an overload at the back.
There are several ways to do this – Wicky’s men explore all avenues.
In this example, Basel are defending in a 4-4-2 shape.
Young Boys’ pivot player Sandro Lauper has dropped out to the right to become an auxiliary fullback.
Lauper could also fall between the centre-backs or even scoot across to the left to do the same thing, with all options providing him with different angles and possibilities to progress the ball.
Nevertheless, Wicky also allows his wide central midfielders to move into this fullback position to receive the ball.
This is done to draw players out of the opposition’s block and create spaces for others to move into and receive.
However, a common method of creating this plus-one scenario at Young Boys is using the goalkeeper in a higher position.
This is potentially the riskiest aspect of Young Boys’ game.
Many coaches would be anxious about having the goalkeeper so far out of position.
Still, Wicky has full trust in his goalkeeper, Anthony Racioppi, to circulate the ball around and play through the opponent’s first line.
The 24-year-old keeper’s heatmap backs this up.
Racioppi spends a lot of time outside his own area with the ball, passing it around with his centre-backs, hoping to bypass the opposition’s press and progress the ball further up the pitch.
Today’s goalkeepers are comfortable with the ball at their feet, but very few venture outside their own area for prolonged periods of games.
Keep an eye on Racioppi for the future.
Young Boys are quite adept at beating a press, too.
Many of their progressive passes this season have come from the centre-backs or the goalkeeper in the first third of the pitch.
Their build-up routines are creative and fluid, but things get a little bristly and rigid further up the field.
Cross, cross, cross
Referring to the aforementioned pizza chart, Young Boys rely quite heavily on crosses to create opportunities during a game.
Given their position in the league, they rank relatively low in terms of key passes and actually getting into the final third.
But once they get there, Wicky wants balls to be whipped in with speed.
Because Young Boys deploy a very narrow formation in the central areas, the fullbacks are relied upon to provide the service.
Using this data viz, let’s analyse Young Boys’ created chances this season in the Swiss Super League.
The first detail that stands out is just how many shot assists stem from the flanks.
Balls are constantly being crossed in from the wide areas towards the forwards.
When in these positions, Wicky instructs his team to pack the box with a lot of bodies, which often causes an overload against the opposition’s available defence.
YB had five players in and around the 18-yard area, one of whom whipped the ball in while four remained back.
Normally, teams attack with five and defend with five.
In this instance, Young Boys attacked with six and defended with four—quite a risky approach, once again, from the league leaders.
Analysing the directions of Young Boys’ crosses, Wicky’s men have seen more success down the right side, but the difference is marginal at best.
Young Boys are the top goalscorers in Switzerland’s top-flight division and have averaged roughly 2.5 goals per 90, which is an outstanding record, especially when paired with a defensive record of 0.73 goals conceded per game.
What’s more impressive is that Wicky’s side have overperformed their xG too.
The Swiss giants are not struggling in front of goal.
Having registered a non-penalty xG of 48.34 so far, Young Boys have bagged 53 times, excluding goals or xG from the spot.
Furthermore, while some balls are still being struck from range, most are inside the box, where the highest-quality chances come from.
Conclusion
Wicky’s tactics at Young Boys are certainly intriguing, although his approach is not overly innovative.
However, the system being deployed by the head coach is effective, to say the least.
The club’s stakeholders would have wanted to erase last season from their memories, and Wicky has made that much easier than it seemed at the time.
From 15 points adrift of their own title in the previous campaign to 15 points on top this time around, Young Boys are back at the summit of the Swiss Alps, and it’ll take an extraordinary effort to knock them off their perch once again.
