The Bundesliga title race is rather dull, if we are being honest; Bayern Munich and Vincent Kompany are already running away with the title.
Behind FC Bayern, there is a vast power struggle about who is number two in German football at the moment.
The three key players in this race are Borussia Dortmund, RB Leipzig, and Bayer Leverkusen.
After Dortmund’s win to start the last matchday before the Christmas break, the game between RB Leipzig and Bayer Leverkusen became even more important than it already was.
RB Leipzig have been going through a recovery season after missing out on European football for the first time since their promotion last season.
Ole Werner and his men went on an impressive run at the beginning of the season, but have recently cooled off, winning only two of their last five games, though those wins were very convincing.
On the other hand, Bayer Leverkusen was the clear number two in Germany last season under Xabi Alonso.
Still, after a massive rebuild in the summer and an early coaching change after just two matchdays, the team struggled to start the season, but quickly turned things around under new coach Kasper Hjulmand.
In the end, Leverkusen won the away game in Leipzig 1-3, deservedly so.
In this RB Leipzig vs Bayer Leverkusen tactical analysis, we will examine the tactics used by Ole Werner and Kasper Hjulmand, how Bayer Leverkusen edged out Leipzig, and why the game unfolded the way it did.
RB Leipzig Vs Bayer Leverkusen Players & Formations Used
Ole Werner isn’t a fan of change, and he once again showcased that fact through his lineup in his usual 4-3-3 formation.
Peter Gulacsi started in goal with a back-four consisting of Kosta Nedeljkovic, Willi Orban, Castello Lukeba, and skipper David Raum in front of him.
Nicolas Seiwald played as the holding midfielder with Xaver Schlager and Christoph Baumgartner completing the entirely Austrian midfield for Leipzig.
In the attack, Conrad Harder played on the right wing, Tidiam Gomis on the left wing, and Romulo in central attack, with Yan Diomande missing the game due to AFCON.
For Kasper Hjulmand, things went a bit differently, with a back three in a 3-4-2-1 formation.
Mark Flekken started in goal, with Jeanuel Belocian playing as the left centre-back, Loic Badé in the centre, and captain Robert Andrich on the right side of the backline.
Aleix García played as the holding midfielder with Malik Tillman completing the double-pivot.
Nathan Tella and Arthur played as the two wingbacks, with Jonas Hofmann and Martin Terrier playing in attacking midfield for the Danish coach.
In the attack, Patrick Schick got the nod as the starting striker once again for Leverkusen.
Bayer Leverkusen Dominating Through Build-Up
Despite playing away from home, Bayer Leverkusen managed to control possession, holding 56% throughout the game, even when leading for most of the time.
Hjulmand values a build-up play through short passes, and they did really well to negate the pressure Werner was trying to achieve with his players.
What’s really interesting is the asymmetrical way they were positioning their backline when building up in line one.
Hjulmand heavily included Flekken in the build-up, creating a pseudo back-four with two players being on the right side of the field and the right centre-back being pushed closely towards the sideline.
Leverkusen often played through their right side, actively trying to draw Leipzig’s pressure.
From then on, they always dropped García back towards the backline.
The Spanish holding midfielder is excellent off the ball and moves very well between the pressing attackers, always able to receive the ball.
This allowed Leverkusen to always play the ball into midfield and find solutions through the triangle by playing and moving, or by simply playing a backwards pass out of pressure and switching play to the other side.
Bayer Leverkusen focused heavily on playing through the right side, often trying to find Andrich near the sideline.
This always acted as a trigger for the Leipzig attackers and the near-sided central midfielder and full-back to step up, which was precisely what Hjulmand wanted to achieve.
For Leverkusen, the key target was to get in behind those players into the half-space in front of the backline, especially on the far side.
With their quality on the ball, the risk of actually losing the ball in these situations was rather slim, so it all worked out for Leverkusen to start the game.
When they managed to get behind the first line of press, they changed their structure in the build-up.
Their back-three was narrower in these situations, with the two wing-backs now tasked with providing width for Bayer Leverkusen.
This stretched the two Leipzig wingers, allowing Leverkusen to gain an advantage in midfield.
Now, only García was dropping back, and Tillman was actually pushing forward, creating a numerical advantage.
Werner positioned his midfielders very aggressively, trying to use the coverage shadow of his central midfielders to cut off passes into midfield.
Hjulmand used that to his advantage by positioning his midfielders in the space behind the Leipzig midfielders.
Seiwald was now forced to defend alone against three players, something he could not do, given the numerical disparity.
In this situation, Leverkusen finds the line-breaking pass through the gap between the midfielders, right to Tillmann in the centre of the field.
Leverkusen often managed to play those passes into the space behind the midfielders and get actions right in front of the backline, which put a lot of pressure on the Leipzig defenders.
Still, Hjulmand’s men were not able to capitalise in terms of goals for a long time in the first half.
RB Leipzig Attempted Responses
RB Leipzig had trouble actually applying pressure to the ball for most of the game, and even when it seemed they had Bayer Leverkusen cornered, they always managed to find a way to get behind the press.
Werner decided to play a very man-oriented press at Leipzig and did so again against Bayer Leverkusen.
The numerical match-up with his attackers matched the three defenders in the backline, so that was rather easy to assign, but it got harder for Leipzig the further backwards you look.
Especially on the left side of the backline, players often had to press forward and leave their positions.
Raum had to press onto the wing-back, while Lukeba had to press forward into midfield.
This often completely broke down the formation for Werner’s men and hindered them from being compact against the ball, leaving space for Leverkusen to exploit.
But they did things really well in the press sometimes, especially when they managed to find a backwards pass as a trigger.
Instead of waiting or falling back, the three attackers, especially Romulo, often pushed forward quickly and put immediate pressure on the receiving player, creating trouble for Leverkusen.
They collectively pushed forward then and managed to actually win balls with their press at times, even though not very often.
Bayer Leverkusen has a lot of quality on the ball, and they showcased that in every single situation, but even when their first line of press got played through or over, the players behind covered really well, and Leipzig was able to at least limit Leverkusen’s options when building up.
Leipzig actually managed to get the lead through a situation like this.
When García received a backwards pass, he was put under pressure quickly by Romulo and, in the end, had to play the ball out of bounds for a Leipzig throw-in.
Out of this throw-in, Schlager was able to get a shot off with a brilliant individual play and get Leipzig in the lead.
RB Leipzig Controlling The Half-Space
With the ball, Ole Werner gave Leipzig a clear plan as well: they wanted to exploit the half-spaces, with their two central midfielders pushed up to a very high position.
Here we can see the Leipzig midfielder pushing high up the field in the space between the lines; even the attackers drop back into the half-space to receive vertical passes, or, even better, diagonal passes directly from the centre-backs.
With a very narrow double-pivot and very passive centre-backs, Leipzig were often able to find the players in the half-space and get them to turn towards goal.
Even when they don’t find a solution with their first pass, they are able to simply play a lay-off back to the now-open midfielder. Schlager was open after the first pass in this case.
Schlager then plays the diagonal pass forward into the far-sided half-space, where Baumgartner already is in a half-open stance, ready to receive the ball.
With the centre-backs not pressing forward into midfield, the Leipzig players were able to dribble forward onto the backline often.
Most of the time, they dribbled right at the gap between the centre-back and the wing-back, forcing a reaction.
Hjulmand wanted his centre-backs not to press forward, so the wing-backs had to engage in the duels and put pressure on the ball.
With an extra player on the wing, Leipzig created opportunities for through-balls to its wingers, even though, in this case, Arthur fouled Baumgartner before he could play the pass to the outside.
Still, just minutes after taking the lead, Leipzig’s backline got caught napping, and Martin Terrier was able to find the back of the net with a superb header.
Just four minutes later, Schick finished off an attack beautifully to give Leverkusen the lead at halftime.
Bayer Leverkusen Playing More Straightforward
With the lead, Bayer Leverkusen became more patient and took fewer risks; they now played in a wider shape and didn’t attract the press as much, but still managed to play through RB Leipzig’s first line of press at pretty much all times.
They also found themselves with more space in the second half and became much more straightforward in their approach when they reached midfield.
A very interesting adjustment was to drop back the near-sided attacking midfielder, dragging the near-sided centre-back out of his position.
This opened up space behind the backline, and Leverkusen was now much more aggressive in these situations.
Tillmann was now often pushed higher up the field when the near-sided attacking midfielder dropped back, serving as the target man for the through balls Leverkusen was now trying to find.
The midfielder was making a diagonal run right into the space where the centre-back should be, allowing his teammates to just play the long ball over the top of the defence and find him as a runner.
While he lost the duel to Raum in this situation, Leverkusen found some very good counterattacks, punishing Leipzig for the need to be more aggressive.
It took them a relatively long time, but in stoppage time, Hjulmand’s team was able to find the deciding counterattack and score their third goal to put away the game after a long ball just like the one we saw in the picture.
Conclusion
In the end, both teams had their moments and showed why they are currently on track to qualify for the UEFA Champions League through the Bundesliga.
Leverkusen was just a bit better, controlling possession, showing a lot of quality on the ball, negating Leipzig’s man-oriented press, and always finding reasonable solutions in the passing game.
After a horrible start to the season, Bayer Leverkusen and Kasper Hjulmand are back on track for a good season in the Bundesliga, and this was a big win away from home for the team.
For Ole Werner, after a very good run to start the season, this winter has been somewhat disappointing.
While RB Leipzig didn’t play badly, their ideas didn’t work against this Leverkusen team, and a good team even exploited some of them.
The winter break comes at the right time for Leipzig, which now needs to quickly find a way to be more dangerous in the final third without Yan Diomande.

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