This past weekend in the Premier League has been one of the more interesting in recent memory.
Cardiff City shutout a promising Leicester side, Wolves ran out 3-1 winners at Wembley, and Liverpool trounced Arsenal to maintain distance between their rivals atop the table. Burnley’s 2-0 win over West Ham wasn’t the most surprising score of the late-December fixtures, but it certainly juxtaposed itself to the previous four months’ results. How exactly did Burnley – eyeing relegation – defeat Manuel Pelligrini’s ambitious London side?
Tactical Preface
Manuel Pellegrini’s West Ham United visited Turf Moor in phenomenal form. After a loss to Manchester City in November, the Chilean has taken his side on a run of five wins in six. West Ham’s good squad depth allows Pellegrini to utilize a variety of different starting elevens; after a 2-1 win in Southampton, Mark Noble came in to replace Pedro Obiang while Marco Arnautovic’s return from injury saw Grady Diangana relegated to the bench.
West Ham set up in a 4-4-2 with utility man Michail Antonio at right-back. Antonio and, to an extent, Aaron Cresswell are attack-minded full-backs, meaning they often push up high. This can be a great asset, but on Sunday it was a factor in the Hammers’ downfall. Declan Rice and Noble formed a double-pivot in midfield to cover Angelo Ogbanna and Issa Diop. Up top, Lucas Pérez and Arnautovic struggled to assert themselves.
Burnley have not looked like their usual selves this season. Their form is in sharp contrast to that of West Ham: a 1-0 win over Brighton on December 8th was their only point in seven and their first win since September. Sean Dyche opted to drop Joe Hart for Tom Heaton after the Englishman conceded five against Everton. A defensive re-work was in the cards as Burnley switched from a five-man defence to a traditional 4-4-2.
Chris Wood replaced Sam Vokes up top, which in hindsight was a masterstroke of a move by Dyche. Ashley Barnes and Wood combined to terrorize West Ham’s defence, while midfielders Ashley Westwood and Dwight McNeil produced spectacular performances.
The two 4-4-2s clashed at the Turf Moor and, on paper, were relatively well-matched. But statistics don’t always take into account how strong Burnley’s tactical execution is. By halftime, West Ham were truly down for the count at 2-0. While Pellegrini’s defence did a bad job in dealing with the home side’s attacks, it was Burnley’s strikers who stole the show.
Wood and Barnes: Burnley’s dynamic duo
New Zealand striker Chris Wood will be remembered for his goal on 15 minutes, but he and his strike partner contributed so much more than that. Barnes and Wood combined to make 6 key passes and 82 ball touches (Pérez and Arnautovic made one and had 49 touches). Dyche knew exactly how to get his strikers involved and it seriously hurt West Ham’s game plans.
A lot of Burnley’s passing actions involve launching the ball forward. Whether it be from Heaton, the defenders, or even midfield, the aim is almost always to find Barnes or Wood in space. The strikers are so good at finding pockets of space in front of or behind the backline.
Burnley don’t keep much of the ball (43% on average and on the day) but they keep it when and where it matters. When Barnes comes deep to receive a long ball from James Tarkowski, teammates around him know to prepare for what’s next. For Wood, this often means making a run in behind. For Burnley’s midfield four, this means finding other pockets of space to receive a third-man pass.
Where Burnley’s strikers really hurt West Ham was their runs in behind. With full-backs Cresswell and Antonio pushed up higher, Wood and Barnes were often able to isolate themselves against the centre-backs. Diop and Ogbonna struggled greatly to deal with these movements.
Many of Burnley’s balls in behind weren’t immediately threatening. They instead were delivered either as aerial balls to be headed down or long balls in the half-spaces. In the example above, Ashley Barnes had space to run onto Westwood’s pass because Cresswell (3) was marking Johan Gudmundsson. Ogbonna’s late reaction gave Barnes time to cross into the box where Burnley players were making delayed runs. Note also how Burnley’s back four remains structured and not prone to a counter-attack.
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