There is no single best formation in football.
Each has its strengths and weaknesses, and coaches must be flexible enough to recognise when and in what context to use a specific one.
This tactical analysis will give you the attacking tactics of the 4-2-3-1 system.
We will use tactical theory to explain some of the basic concepts and structures behind it and then, through further analysis, recognise what patterns make it so effective in the first place.
Connections & relationships in a 4-2-3-1 Formation
The 4-2-3-1 formation is popular for numerous reasons.
Coaches like Pep Guardiola, Rafa Benitez and José Mourinho are still famous for utilising it almost perfectly.
Although it was more popular in years past, modern coaches are also revisiting the tactical concepts that made the teams of the 2000s and 2010s so successful.
Of course, the structure itself is a variation of both the 4-4-2 and the 4-3-3 systems but can also be a continuation of the 4-1-4-1 and 4-5-1 systems.
The reason for its popularity is mainly the flexible approach it offers, giving the team balance in both defence and attack.
Below, you can see a passing grid we’ve created to illustrate how the 4-2-3-1 formation lends itself well to positional football.
Coaches have used it differently over the years but aim to create superiorities across the pitch.
Notice how every player has multiple connections and passing channels to exploit when on the ball.
The movement is also crucial here, of course, so the structure’s success will depend on the creativity of specific player roles.
Still, with the possibility of easily positioning at least two, and often three, players in every zone of the pitch, the 4-2-3-1 is a great system for exploiting overloads.
The creation of triangles helps ball progression, and we can see that this particular formation adheres perfectly to those possession principles.
A similar thing happens once the play is shifted to the final third.
There, the 4-2-3-1 will often transition to 2-4-3-1, but it’s much more fluid and complex than just numbers on a sheet.
Once again, the key is the connections it creates in a multi-layered structure.
The passing network will change, however, depending on the personnel and the type of individual player roles used on the pitch.
The no 10 is, however, one of the most important pieces of the jigsaw as he has the freedom to roam and create overloads in different areas of the final third.
We will discuss the numerical superiority that the 4-2-3-1 easily establishes later in this tactical analysis piece.
However, speaking of player roles, as much as it depends on the coach’s preferences, this structure requires specific player profiles for it to be effective.
Below, we have outlined the responsibilities of each squad member briefly.
Note, however, that with some of them, this represents multiple options rather than all the tasks they have in every game.
This tactical theory won’t delve in-depth into player roles and responsibilities, apart from the double pivot and the number 10, as this aspect can heavily depend on both the coach’s tactics and the personnel available.
However, we are still interested in the general patterns and relationships that the 4-2-3-1 creates on the pitch.
We’ve already touched upon the grid that lends itself nicely to creating triangles and passing angle,s so let’s explore that a bit further.
Everything begins with the build-up phase, and this is where the system’s strengths are perhaps most visible.
Below is a graphical representation of the relationship that was modelled after Luca Bertolini’s pattern when describing player connections on the pitch.
Bertolini also distinguishes between the relationships the players form in different phases of play, meaning that this graph changes as the team swaps between the attacking and build-up structures.
What you can see up here is indeed the latter phase, which is what we’ll deal with now.
Four primary combinations enable positional play when building from the back.
The first one is between the goalkeeper and his respective centre-back and full-back on either side of the pitch.
This is the basic setup with possession-based teams.
As the ball moves into higher zones, the centre-back and full-back will start combining with one of the pivots on each side.
Of course, there are possible variations to this approach, such as when the team faces a high press and the other midfielder shifts over to ensure numerical superiority.
The third triangular connection consists of the three midfielders, including the double pivot and the No. 10.
This is where the play starts to move into the danger zone and the feet of the most creative pieces of the squad.
Finally, we have the advanced midfielder’s relationship with one of the wingers and the centre-forward.
As he is most often the freest player in the final third, he has the licence to roam and combine on either flank.
Now that we have outlined some of the key principles and relationships of the 4-2-3-1’s attacking tactics, this tactical analysis will dissect specific principles that make the structure so potent.
Width & overloads
We have already pointed out how this formation is excellent at creating overloads across the pitch.
With two central midfielders providing support for the backline, this ensures numerical superiority in the first phase of build-up.
The two pivots combine with both centre-backs and full-backs to enable the smooth progression of the ball.
However, the 4-2-3-1 formation is best at creating overloads in the half-space, which is often the very area most teams want to control, both inside their half and the opposition’s.
Let’s observe two examples of half-space overloads in both scenarios.
Firstly, in the build-up phase.
Naturally, with possession-based teams that aim to advance through positional rotations, the centre-backs will spread out and occupy their respective half-spaces.
Interestingly, if the team in question is playing with a sweeper-keeper who is good on the ball, they too can participate in this phase of attack.
The full-backs can stay wide, but there is also an option for them to invert into the half-space, too, as they are joined by one or two central midfielders as well.
Note, once again, that the movement you see in the graph above doesn’t necessarily happen all at once within the same attacking action.
Sometimes, it isn’t necessary for all the players who participate in the build-up phase to overload the same area of the pitch.
There must be an unmarked outlet where the ball can be transitioned once the overload is complete.
In our case above, we can see the wingers staying wide but dropping deeper to potentially receive the pass from the congested first third of the pitch.
Once the ball is in the final third, the same principles apply.
The half-space can be overloaded easily because of the free role the no.10 has and the double-pivot who stays just ahead of the centre-backs.
Again, we see the centre-backs spread out on their respective sides, and the pivots do the same thing.
They can drift wide to cover for the full-backs if they are overlapping or drift to create numerical superiority in the half-space, as discussed.
As you can see, there are two main options here for the wingers and the full-backs.
Generally speaking, a natural winger will hug the touchline, while an inverted winger will cut in centrally.
The same is true for the full-backs, and the relationship between the two roles will depend on the type of player you have in each position.
In a 4-2-3-1’s attacking tactics, however, this plays a huge role.
Let’s explore both scenarios with some graphs down below.
First, we’ll tackle the inverted winger/overlapping full-back combination.
This seems to be the more popular version in today’s football.
The idea, once again, is relatively simple – the wingers will cut inside and advance through the half-space, occupying zone 14 alongside the centre-forward.
This is often the primary source of width in a 4-2-3-1 formation, but the approach to achieving it varies among different coaches.
The goal is to create space on the flanks so that the full-backs can be ejected behind the opposition’s backline.
Guardiola’s Bayern Munich, for example, worked exclusively with inverted wingers.
They ensured the full-backs were unmarked by overloading the centre of the pitch instead, inviting all the pressure inward.
Here’s an example against Atlético Madrid back in the day.
You can see how narrow the Rojiblancos are defending, and it’s all the result of Bayern congesting the central areas and attracting their attention.
At the same time, with Jérôme Boateng on the ball, the full-backs are bursting forward and can exploit the completely free flanks.
Both David Alaba (off-screen, on the left) and Philipp Lahm are already in a position to receive the ball in a full sprint and run in behind the Madrid team’s defensive line.
This ‘overload the centre and release the wing’ is a typical pattern in 4-2-3-1’s attacking tactics, although it can work the other way around as well.
Guardiola, for example, knew how to balance the two even though he preferred the former move.
Another example from the same match can be seen below.
This time, Thomas Müller, the no.10, shifts over to the right side to overload the wing with the full-back and the winger.
Apart from potentially creating a numerically superior position out wide, it also forces the opposition to react.
Atlético immediately had to shift another defender towards that area to stop Bayern from progressing, but that opened up space centrally and around zone 14.
Also, note the movement of the double pivot, in this case, Arturo Vidal and Xabi Alonso.
One moves forward towards the opening that was just created,d while the other stays deeper and potentially shifts out wide.
This opens a safer passing channel in case the ball needs to go backwards and also provides cover.
The alternative option for width, however, is to invert the full-backs or keep them deeper, allowing the wingers to hug the touchline, as shown below.
Again, one pivot will then stay deeper to support the centre-back duo while the other moves up the pitch and looks to combine with his advanced teammates.
With the inverted full-backs, it’s also an option to help combat numerical inferiority in the centre, once again trying to attract the opposition inward.
However, the main point to be taken from this is the freedom of no.10 to move across the final third in search of these overloads.
Our final example features a similar setup, with Spain’s national team utilising a double-pivot formation, where Sergio Busquets accompanies Alonso.
This time, however, we’ll look at the build-up play higher up the pitch.
Notice the half-space overload Spain are creating in the image above.
This staggered positioning in that area attracts Portugal’s defenders, leaving the flank open for Álvaro Arbeola to exploit.
It only takes a cheeky flick by Xavi Hernández to transition the ball into the open space, and Spain can successfully advance up the pitch.
The double-pivot and the no.10
The final part of this tactical analysis will delve a bit deeper into the different roles and responsibilities of the two most interesting and unique positions in the 4-2-3-1 system – the double-pivot and the no.10 role.
Both are specific to the formation as not many other structures utilise it as much or at all.
We’ll finish the tactical theory piece by taking a look at how some of the modern coaches like Frank Lampard, Ronald Koeman and Mikel Arteta set up their players in those roles
First, however, we have to explain their responsibilities in more detail.
A part of this was already covered in the first section of the analysis, but we’ll delve deeper into it later.
Starting with the double-pivot, the main characteristic of this structure is the difference in roles between the two midfielders.
Above, you can see a graph that shows us both players with arrows depicting the subtle differences in their movements and actions.
One is the more defensive player, while the other has the licence to drop deeper to progress play and burst forward, offering support to the attacking line.
Following Bertolini’s model once again, the circles represent the main build-up relationships the pivots form on the pitch.
Their main tasks are both defensive and offensive.
Defensively, they offer the rest-defence in the final third and often slot wide if the full-backs are highly aggressive.
Offensively, ball progression and attacking support are key.
The latter, usually, for just one of the two, often the left pivot.
You can see this relationship below at Chelsea as Jorginho drops to the backline to create numerical superiority against Sevilla.
On the other hand, N’Golo Kanté stays higher as support and moves to open another passing channel.
Interestingly, it’s often the player who is better on the ball and moving with the ball who drops deeper and then progresses higher while in possession.
A similar setup is used at Barcelona, for example, where Frenkie de Jong and Sergio Busquets often combine.
Even though the former is the one to drop deeper and into the backline, he is also the one that progresses the ball and moves up with it into advanced areas.
You can see an example of this below.
Here, both pivots are deep due to the high Sevilla press, but it’s De Jong who gets to combine with his full-back and No. 10 to bypass the press and actually move with the ball, as opposed to progressing through passing.
The above example is also a very good introduction to the other role this tactical theory will analyse, and that’s the advanced midfielder or the no.10.
In a 4-2-3-1, he is often the most creative player in the squad and also the one with the most freedom.
We have already discussed his role in creating overloads, but now, we’ll take a look at how that might translate into the pitch.
As the most creative and thus among the most dangerous players on the team, he can be tasked with being either a second striker or an advanced creator, interchanging positions with other players and roaming the final third.
Below is a graphic that shows us a general approach on the flanks, with the advanced midfielder joining the wings to create an overload on the opposition’s defenders.
Once again, this will depend on coach to coach, but these are the key characteristics no.10 gives to a team.
For instance, Arteta used the double-pivot and advanced midfielder combination during the spell when Arsenal were deployed in a 4-2-3-1 formation.
Now, of course, he prefers the 3-4-3, but it is interesting to revisit his view of the formation.
In the following example, you can actually see Mesut Özil drift wide to the right side of the pitch to create an overload we mentioned earlier in the tactical analysis.
Returning to Chelsea and Lampard, we observe a similar pattern in their tactics.
Kai Havertz, the newcomer, will often assume this role, and his movement across the final third is similarly free.
The youngster will drift wide to create overloads, similar to Özil in the previous example.
However, with Havertz, especially, we can see him making runs in behind the defensive line.
The entire sequence below is interesting because it effectively illustrates the tasks associated with the role.
Firstly, Havertz goes wide and is positioned in the half-space, overloading it and opening a new passing channel.
In the end, Chelsea goes wide, and this is a cue for him to start his run into the box.
Essentially, the number 10 has to offer support, help create passing channels and overloads, be an inside or outside option for the wingers, and be comfortable playing between the lines.
It sounds like a lot, but that’s because that role is essential to the attacking tactics of the 4-2-3-1 structure.
Conclusion
As we’ve mentioned earlier in this tactical analysis, no formation is perfect.
Still, there is a reason why the 4-2-3-1 is making a comeback of sorts, and plenty of top European teams are gravitating back towards it.
Of course, the defensive structure of this system is also quite interesting, and we might cover that next time.
