Tottenham Hotspur Vs Manchester United [1-0] – UEFA Europa League Final 2024/2025 – Tactical Analysis

Tottenham Hotspur have lifted the UEFA Europa League trophy following a 1-0 win over Manchester United.

In addition to the silverware, this win grants Tottenham participation in next season’s UEFA Champions League despite finishing in the 17th spot in the Premier League—a remarkable achievement for the team this season.

In fact, they broke the record of the teams winning European trophies while holding poor spots in their league standings since no team has ever won a European trophy while being 17th in their own league.

On the other hand, Manchester United suffered yet another excruciating defeat, deepening their continuous crisis under Ruben Amorim.

They finished the Premier League season in 16th spot and, obviously, will not participate in Europe next season.

This tactical analysis article will cover the match from two angles: exploring Tottenham’s defensive organisation under Ange Postecoglou tactics, how Spurs managed to limit Man United’s threats, and identifying Manchester United’s playmaking and attacking issues.

Tottenham & Manchester United Lineups & Formations

Ange Postecoglou started the match with his Spurs side in a 4-3-3 formation, with Guglielmo Vicario as a goalkeeper, Pedro Porro, Cristian Romero, Micky van de Ven, and Destiny Udogie in defence.

The midfield was formed of three central midfielders: Yves Bissouma, Rodrigo Bentancur, and Pape Matar Sarr.

This helped Tottenham have a powerful, physical yet very technical and intelligent midfield trio.

Sarr even played as an advanced playmaker at certain times in the offensive phase, retreating to the same line of the trio after losing the ball.

This helped Tottenham have more opportunities to keep possession inside the final third while not losing the numerical advantage when defending.

In attack, Postecoglou surprised most followers by using Richarlison from the beginning instead of Son Heung-min, who was expected to start this match.

That change appeared to benefit Richarlison and the team, who changed the rhythm whenever he wanted, retreated to help in the defensive phase whenever needed, provided accurate long and short passes, and was involved in almost all of Tottenham’s attacking attempts.

Brennan Johnson was used as a right-winger, and the team’s striker was Dominic Solanke.

Ruben Amorim opted for his preferred 3-4-2-1 formation for the Red Devils, with André Onana as a goalkeeper and Harry Maguire, Leny Yoro, and Luke Shaw as centre-backs.

Although Amorims choice to rely on Shaws experience in such a tense game is understandable, we must say that using a slow defender in a match like this and against a winger like Johnson, knowing that he also had to cover for Solanke’s movements, seems like a risky decision by Amorim.

In fact, it was easy to notice that Shaw was not at his best.

His slow movements and decision-making impacted Manchester United’s possession average, ball losses in their own half, and counter-attacking risks.

Victor Lindelöf, who is used to playing in that position in a back-three defence, would have been a more suitable choice for this matchs circumstances.

More importantly, he has a natural centre-back profile and defends better than Shaw.

In midfield, playing with Bruno Fernandes and Casemiro was not the best midfield duo to opt for in such a game.

It is true that both players have the experience needed to play such games.

However, Fernandes cannot give 100% of his abilities when playing as a central midfielder, and the team loses a large part of his playmaking contribution in this way, in addition to losing the defensive addition that another pure central midfielder would offer.

Therefore, keeping Fernandes in an advanced playmaker position and opting for Manuel Ugarte or Kobbie Mainoo as a central midfielder along with Casemiro would have guaranteed the needed balance in Manchester United’s midfield.

It would have helped them secure their defence further and create more chances upfront with Fernandes playing inside the final third.

Another surprising decision was to use Mason Mount from the start, even though the player is not in his best form at the moment.

This was done while keeping a fresh winger like Alejandro Garnacho on the bench and using him only starting from the 71st minute.

Despite that, Garnacho was able to make the difference for Manchester United during the last minutes of the game.

His agility and dribbling skills created a real danger for Tottenham’s defence, which confirmed the wrong choice of using Mount from the start.

He lacked the pace and agility needed to beat Porro in one-on-one situations.

Amorim used both Noussair Mazraoui and Patrick Dorgu as wing-backs, with Amad Diallo leaning towards the right wing so often and playing on the same line with Mount, behind the main striker Rasmus Højlund, who Joshua Zirkzee then replaced.

Given both strikers’ performance in this match, it is fair to say that Zirkzee deserved even more time during this match as he disturbed Tottenham’s defence in the little time he got more than Højlund did in the 71 minutes he played.

Zirkzee was more aggressive in duels and tried to fight on every half opportunity he got, unlike those who did not really provide the needed depth in Tottenham’s box, nor did they create dangerous opportunities for themselves or their teammates.

Manchester United Final Pass & Finishing Issues

No one can deny that Manchester United’s results and performances are disappointing and worrying.

Despite the potential and value of many of the players, Manchester United’s attacking playing style always lacks a kind of misconnection, especially inside the final third.

The most cruci