Bo Svensson is a 42-year-old manager in Mainz in the Bundesliga.
Given his age, it is perhaps unsurprising to hear that his managerial career is still in its infancy; however, he is nevertheless showing considerable talent, assembling teams with an exciting, intense, pressing, and direct attacking style.
He began his coaching career with Mainz’s youth set-up before taking the Head Coach position at FC Liefering, which plays in Austria’s second division.
Liefering plays the Red Bull brand of football, given that they are RB Salzburg’s second team in all but name.
After three months in charge of Mainz, Jan-Moritz Liechte’s tenure ended, and Svensson returned, this time in charge of the first team.
At the time of writing, Svensson has a 44% win rate, and Mainz is in the middle of a terrific season.
They sit comfortably in the top half of the table and are potentially beginning to think about European qualification.
This tactical analysis will provide an overview of Svensson’s tactics with Mainz and analyze some of the key concepts at various points in the game.
Bo Svensson Formations and personnel
Svensson exclusively plays with a back three, as evident from the formations he has used throughout the season thus far.
Whilst he has used a front three or lone forward at times, through a 3-4-3 or 5-4-1, he greatly prefers to play with two forwards.
Svensson also has a pretty clear preferred starting XI.
Robin Zentner has been a regular in goal, while Stefan Bell, Alexander Hack, and Moussa Niakhate have been his favoured starting back three. However, he has also given minutes to Jerry St Juste and David Nemeth in these positions.
While Anderson-Lenda Lucoqui has had game time at left wingback, Aaron Martin has played more minutes, and Silvan Widmer has been a constant at right wingback.
Dominik Kohr or Anton Stach hold the midfield three, while Jean-Paul Boetius, Jae-Sung Lee, or Leandro Barreiro Martins will play ahead of them.
Kevin Stoger has also been featured with some frequency.
Up front, Jonathan Burkadt and Karim Onisiwo have been favoured, but Marcus Ingvartsen and Adam Szalai have also contributed significantly with minutes.
Bo Svensson Tactics In possession
Svensson doesn’t purely look to use counter-attacking by any means.
Whilst they average less than 50% of possession (44.7%), they are still committed to building from the back, albeit with a commitment to playing forward quickly and ruthlessly.
Svensson builds with a wide back three, and while Kohr or Stach, whichever plays, often offers in the single pivot position, they also offer in that space during build-up.
Hack will drift into that space to provide an easy line-breaking pass option for either of his wide centre-backs.
He can be found with the pass option shown in the following image, but if the ball is worked wide down the line to the wing-back, Hack may well continue his run and be a passing option inside for that player as well.
Svensson likes to get his midfield three on the ball relatively early, though.
He uses them in a compact triangle to ensure possession is retained while also providing a counter-pressing threat if one loses the ball.
As a result, they can afford to be bold in possession.
We can see their general shape: one wingback is already high, while the other begins to move forward as the ball progresses.
There is that tight midfield three and the two centre-forwards ahead of them, ready to make runs in behind.
Svensson doesn’t want his team to engage in needless possession if there is a clear forward pass option on.
We can see how quickly Boetius recognises the chance to release Burkadt in the following image, sliding the ball in behind, with Onisiwo already moving into a central attacking position to offer Burkadt the easy pass across goal.
We can see from the previous example, as well as in the next set of images, how closely Svensson appears to have his midfield operating in line with the front line, or perhaps vice versa.
He allows the wide centre-backs to carry the ball forward, and in doing so, Mainz can create a highly congested central area, similar to the one shown in the following image.
As they play forward into the front line, the two number eights spring into action and look for flicks off of their front two or simply just engage in quick link-up play to advance attacks.
If one of the midfielders can’t directly impact play, they are likely to make a run in behind.
Svensson also likes creating high-percentage shooting opportunities.
And it works.
The only league games they have failed to score in have been against Freiburg, and there’s no shame in that, given their tightest defence and Bayer Leverkusen‘s.
Whilst there have been some quality goals from distance or smart finishes on the break, a remarkable number of goals have also come from inside the six-yard box.
Nine of their 25 league goals at the time of writing have come from this position, and four of their last eight, showing a growing influence on Svensson’s attacking game.
The previous image and the following one are two examples of the kinds of positions that lead to these goals from such close proximity.
They are nearly identical.
Svensson wants the cross to be hit away from the goalkeeper protecting their front post, ensuring they have to shift across their goal rather than come out to claim the ball.
The attacker looking to get on the end of it needs to time their run from a deeper starting position and finish with a first-time shot.
It is basic, but has proven to be a successful route to goal for Svensson’s Mainz.
Bo Svensson Transitions
Svensson’s side are a ruthless counter-attacking team.
He has a starting line-up filled with pacy players and individuals who can quickly break lines, particularly on transition.
Mainz have surely been one of the league’s most effective teams in attacking transition this season, potentially in Europe.
An astonishing statistic is that 15 of the 21 league goals they scored from open play this season have come within 15 seconds of regaining possession.
They frequently work the ball into goalscoring positions even after turning over the ball well inside their own half.
Svensson constructs these counter-attacks through sequences of one-touch passing, often using up, back, and through pass combinations, but not exclusively.
In the following image, we can see a turnover of possession worked into a goalscoring position in three passes.
The turnover initially comes in the central channel, where Mainz so frequently regains possession due to their crowding of this area.
As we’ve seen in this analysis, Mainz’s forwards are consistently ready to make runs in behind.
Onisiwo is found immediately with the pass in behind, while Ingvartsen, in this case, arrives in the centre of the box, ready for the pass across goal and the easy finish from close range.
As soon as possession is won, the ball-winners’ instinct is nearly always to get their heads up and look for the most advantageous forward pass.
The midfielders look to find space to receive the ball beyond the lines, whilst those around them are already working into a position where they can be a pass option for this player.
In the following example, the ball is played forward, with the midfield quickly exchanging it with one-touch passes before the direct ball in behind is played.
Svensson isn’t reconstructing the wheel with this kind of football, but he has his Mainz side so well drilled in this aspect of the game that they are utterly ruthless with it, even against the highest-level opposition.
On defensive transition, they are equally impressive and well-drilled.
They refuse to let an opponent have easy possession after a ball turnover, and the closest player to the turnover is expected to counter-press.
Whilst they do so, the rest of the team tracks back, keeping a compactness as they do.
This includes the forwards.
Everyone tracks back. In the following example, you can even see the midfielders tracking the run of the BSC player running through the middle.
This is while the wingback steps forward to counter-press, and the players immediately around him either cover him, provide pressure, or pick up a potential pass option.
Mainz is incredibly disciplined in regaining possession whenever they lose it, making it highly difficult for the opposition to secure possession on transition.
Svensson allows his centre-backs to be aggressive in this moment too.
Frankly, it is a hazardous move, and while this isn’t a constant thing, they step forward enough, leaving a 2v2 and toying with an offside trap, which could expose them.
However, the centre-backs will only do this if the midfield is played through.
The following example highlights this, first showing their overall compactness after losing possession.
The two midfielders closest to the ball immediately get compact, but of course, this isn’t always enough to stop a counter, and in this example, they are played through.
We can see the left-sided centre-back stepping forward to press the ball, and while he does have his wing-backs tracking back either side of him, it nevertheless leaves a 2v2.
However, in this case, he successfully wins the ball, and Mainz scores immediately after the turnover.
Bo Svensson Tactics Out of possession
Mainz are incredibly impressive defensively.
Other than Freiburg’s 15 goals conceded in the league, Mainz have the next tightest defence, along with Bayern Munich, having conceded just 16 goals at the time of writing.
And yet they don’t sit back and put men behind the ball.
Svensson is committed to pressing high and winning the ball in areas where they can then capitalise on transition and score goals.
As we’ve seen, this approach is working for them.
Their 9.29 PPDA from this season backs this up, showing they are an intensely pressing team.
Yet they don’t just provide pressure and intensity, but are also highly effective at regaining possession through winning challenges.
Their 63.1% defensive duel win rate is the second-highest in the league.
Svensson has his team set up to press in a narrow structure. The two forwards lead the press, closely supported by a staggered midfield three.
The wing-backs start very high, tucked inside to prevent passes in between themselves and their midfield three, but in a position where they can press out wide if necessary, in a half-and-half starting berth.
When the opposition works the ball, the front two will work together to prevent easy inside passage, whilst the wing-back will push forward, closing down the opponent’s space in this area and also preventing an easy pass.
The two number 8’s work across the pitch, picking up any potential inside passes themselves, whilst the far-side wing-back drops back and tucks inside to provide balance.
The midfield three look to keep this central compactness at all times, working together to prevent any kind of central passage for the opposition.
However, they must also be flexible.
Svensson doesn’t want his wing-backs unnecessarily drawn forward and conceding space down the wing either.
In the following image, we can see how the wing-back Widmer holds his position due to the wide presence of the opposition full-back and also because of the central midfielder inside him, ready to creep into the space behind.
This leaves the Mainz forward in this example to work on the BSC centre-back in possession, and the wing-back can’t stop until his inside central midfielder drops behind him to pick up this opposition midfielder.
So whilst they are intense, they are also positionally disciplined.
Mainz will press high straight away from opposition goal kicks and is aggressive in its attempts to regain possession in high areas, regardless of who it is playing against.
The centre-forwards are clever with their positioning, and if they can cut off the opposition centre-backs through their pressing angle, as they do in the following image, whilst the midfielders are able to mark central space and prevent the keeper from playing out through this way, unless the keeper plays long, they can force errors.
They did exactly this against Borussia Dortmund earlier this season, scoring late on and forcing the keeper to try to play pass the press. In this example, the Mainz right-wing back intercepted the ball.
The obvious advantage of regaining possession in such an area is having four attacking players immediately available in the central channel to receive the ball, whereas the opponent is spread relatively wide after losing possession.
In deeper areas, Svensson has his midfield three and front two continue to work in tandem as a tight block of five, working across the pitch together to protect the central channel.
The wing-backs support them and are given the freedom to push high or wide to provide a defensive presence.
In doing so, they prevent these five from having to shift across the entirety of the pitch, providing them respite in wide areas.
When a wingback is drawn wide or forward, Svensson is comfortable operating with the back four separate from this wingback; however, any central midfielders near the back four are expected to provide vertical compactness and prevent any space between the lines.
Conclusion
Svensson is still early in his career as a manager at Mainz, let alone in general.
So, while what we are currently seeing isn’t far from that Red Bull philosophy he worked on for two years at Liefering, he is still adding his own touches and brand to this style of play.
However, what can’t be ignored is that, whilst he has a talented side, he is undoubtedly pulling the best out of them and, truthfully, has them performing well above what many anticipated.
Clearly, his style of football suits his current group of players, and they have bought into the system.
It would be no surprise to see Mainz push for European football as the season progresses, as Svensson continues to grow his reputation as an exciting, young manager.
