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Home Coaches Alessio Dionisi

Near Post Mastery: The Set Piece Routine Palermo Have Mastered Under Alessio Dionisi Tactics – Set Piece Analysis

Marcel Seifeddine by Marcel Seifeddine
February 20, 2025
in Alessio Dionisi, Analysis, Filippo Ranocchia, Palermo FC, Serie B, Set Piece Analysis
0
Alessio Dionisi Tactics At Palermo FC - Set-Piece Analysis

Palermo FC have emerged as one of the most intriguing set-piece threats in European football, as their efficiency from corners has become impossible to ignore.

Paramount to this threat is Filippo Ranocchia, whose average of 0.196 set-play xA per 90 minutes ranks as the second-highest in the world—trailing only Miro Muheim, a former Chelsea player now at Hamburg SV.

A high xA from set plays normally shows consistency in delivery, making it intriguing to investigate how a team makes the most of such a valuable weapon.

In Palermo’s case, the answer lies in their meticulously prepared routines and relentless near-post dominance.

A closer examination of their set pieces reveals just how dangerous they have become.

Palermo have already scored 13 goals from set plays this season, 12 in the league, accounting for an impressive 41% of their total league goals, with the hope of fighting for promotion to Serie A.

Among all teams in Europe’s top five leagues, only Wolfsburg has a higher percentage.

This tactical analysis will explore Alessio Dionisi tactics, focusing on how Palermo maintain a constant threat from corner kicks while using one base structure.

While Palermo’s routines may appear varied from week to week, a deeper analysis reveals a clear underlying strategy connecting them all.

A defining feature of their success is the team’s coordination and clarity in making the movements at the right time.

Usually, a team captures attention through well-executed screens and various routines from game to game.

However, Palermo take a different approach in this set-piece analysis.

Instead of crafting a new recipe each week, they stick to a proven dish, adding just a few different spices each time to keep opponents guessing.

Decoy runs, along with the timing and approach of runs, make each corner kick different and special, although, from a quick glance, it seems like everything is the same.

As this football analysis unfolds, we will break down the tactical nuances that make Palermo stand out from set pieces and explain why stopping them is easier said than done.

Palmero FC Main Set-Piece Routine

Palermo’s success has come from targeting the near post area, aiming to make the first contact at the six-yard line, in line with the front post.

This area is not easy to access, as it requires a flat, hard and precise delivery, but with Filippo Ranocchia’s excellence, the ball can be consistently delivered into the high-value areas without a problem.

Opponents always protect these areas, but the depth of protection differs from game to game depending on the opponent’s strategy.

In the video below, the target area is highlighted.

In this particular instance, there is one defender inside this area and one in front of it.

When the area is protected from both the front and inside, decoy runs are used to drag defenders away from the space and create gaps between zonal defenders.

Because of the defender in front, the delivery has to be slightly higher, more looped, and dip to land at the front post.

The attacker in pink can be seen running across the front of the zonal defender, purposefully coming into his line of sight to attract him and drag him away from the target area.

A big hole is created once the highlighted zonal defender leaves his spot.

Through the good timing of the action, other defenders have multiple issues and cannot cover the space in time.

The defenders in front don’t have the time to scan behind, so they are unaware of the ongoing actions.

In contrast, the defenders towards the back post have a lot of distance to cover.

They must decide in a split-second whether to take the risk of attacking the ball to win the first contact or protecting the space they were originally designated to.

In the clip, the chance is created through this, although the header is inaccurate.

Through the actions of three people—the taker, the decoy, and the target attacker—a clear chance is created, which shows how effective set pieces can be with clarity and good execution.

The other attackers then have the potential to create more blocks, attack rebounds, and be ready for second balls in general.

pic.twitter.com/AXsstwbZa2

— Footie Clips (@FootieClips) February 19, 2025

As mentioned above, the method of winning the first contact at the near post depends on the opponents.

The most straightforward way is when the first zonal defender is closer to the post, giving away more space at the near edge of the six-yard box, like in the clip below.

Again, this is only possible through a consistent-quality delivery.

Still, Palermo can afford to take the risk and send only one attacker to the target zone to win the first contact, as the delivery’s location is known.

Sending more than one would be a waste of a player.

We can split the Palermo attacking unit into three different roles: First Contact, Second Contact, and Securing the Second Phase.

The first contact is self-explanatory, and as described, it depends on the opposition structure.

The more open the structure, the fewer players are needed here, and more can be used in the second contact group.

This group of players (second contact) is designed to make the second contact, which usually means attacking a flick-on from the first post or, in some cases, going for rebounds or any loose balls that appear following a poorly executed first contact.

To maintain control and structure, Palermo must cover as much space as possible to prevent losing possession of the ball too easily.

As a result, we can see the player in red holding his movement to collect balls that get cleared from the six-yard box so that Palermo can be threatening no matter where the ball lands after a clearance.

With four players scattered around the six-yard box for the second contact, it is clear that Palermo targets this.

The heavy presence in the six-yard box shows their preparation for this moment of a corner kick.

With the ball flying across the face of the goal, it is highly likely that a Palermo player will win the second contact, resulting in a goal, as it has done on numerous occasions in the season so far.

pic.twitter.com/uHTIk7VOc8

— Footie Clips (@FootieClips) February 19, 2025

The principle of using a decoy run to drag a zonal defender and attacking space behind that zonal defender continues to be used.

Again, by having so many bodies inside the six-yard box after first contact, Palermo can dominate these situations inside the penalty box.

While the ball travels, the attackers can place themselves goalside of their defenders, as in the example below, to prevent them from blocking shots or from being in the right position to defend a cross in general.

pic.twitter.com/cNoT4cNer1

— Footie Clips (@FootieClips) February 19, 2025

In other instances, the defensive structure is more prepared to defend the near post area by planting more zonal defenders inside.

To combat this, Palermo attempt to overload this space instead of entering it through good timing and exploiting the space already available.

Through the overload, more decoy runs can be used to drag the zonal defender apart, creating the space necessary for one attacker to enter and arrive in the area at the right time.

pic.twitter.com/LGXBSgA2IO

— Footie Clips (@FootieClips) February 19, 2025

In the next clip, Palermo again score a goal through their ability to create space at the near post with decoy runs and their control in the six-yard box during the second phase, through being so brave in the number of bodies they put up.

This time, the focus is on how they manage to win the first contact after the decoy run creates the desired space.

With the zonal defender in that space dragged away, it becomes much easier to win the aerial duel, but that does not mean they are guaranteed to win it, as other defenders can still arrive in time.

It is important for the player attacking the ball to arrive with momentum to aerially dominate opponents who might be bigger but are not in the right body orientation and conditions to attack the ball at its highest point.

There are different ways to increase the chances of a player arriving in better conditions.

Usually, through overloads in the attacking unit, Palermo are able to make a free attacker arrive, not having to do anything special to find the space to attack the ball with the right conditions.

When the overload does not exist, Palermo have used deeper starting positions (further away from the goal) to make it difficult for defenders to arrive in the target area in good conditions.

However, sometimes, increasing the space a player has to defend is not enough, as he might be comfortable defending these larger spaces.

In these moments, Palermo have isolated their strongest players to have 1v1 mismatched situations.

The attackers are much stronger and bigger than the defenders, so they can attack the space while the defenders struggle to put them off balance due to the difference in power and strength.

pic.twitter.com/Ac8ZMu5OZ4

— Footie Clips (@FootieClips) February 19, 2025

The key to the success of the decoy runs has been the timing of these actions.

Usually, an early or late arrival into a target zone can cause problems for the player attacking the space, but the timing needed is much different when the purpose is that of a decoy.

In the example below, the front zonal defender’s body is positioned openly, showing his priority is on the players behind to track the runs.

Because of this, we know the defender is more concerned by the attacker than the space he is protecting.

Through the use of an early run, the player is able to accelerate to the space in front of the defender, baiting the defender to jump from his position.

As the defender jumps, the attacker can then slow down and hold his position, having created space for himself through a quick acceleration.

Usually, an early run means a defender tracks your movement and covers the space you attack, but when a disguise is added to the space you want to attack, the early run becomes a powerful weapon.

pic.twitter.com/eWGtmfbdJl

— Footie Clips (@FootieClips) February 19, 2025

The Palermo attackers show a good understanding of box attacking despite the coordination of the routine.

In the clip below, the target space is already free, but rather than waiting in that space, we can see the highlighted attacker waiting a few yards away from it before attacking it just as the ball enters the area, not giving his defender any time to track his movement and interfere with the cross.

pic.twitter.com/J5fOQcBR0Z

— Footie Clips (@FootieClips) February 19, 2025

In the ‘Second Contact Phase’, directly after Palermo wins the first contact, we can see that Palermo’s attack is organised despite the so-called chaos inside the penalty area.

The attackers highlighted in green all attack different areas inside the six-yard box, causing multiple problems.

By spreading apart and attacking different points, Palermo increase their chances of making the second contact, even if the first header is slightly off where it should be going.

Furthermore, attacking the spaces on either side of zonal defenders gives each defender two problems, one in front and one behind, similar to what happens at the near post.

The zonal defender can choose to track what’s in front of him, leaving a free man behind or holding his position but risking the player in front, who is closer to goal, being free.

pic.twitter.com/wvFWe1OHX6

— Footie Clips (@FootieClips) February 19, 2025

While it seems that Palermo often does the same things or something very similar, at least it is clear that they always target open space, no matter where that is.

With such a precise delivery, the open space Palermo can aim for can be much smaller than other teams, as the ball will still likely end up there.

However, in some circumstances, like the video below, where a team has all 11 players within 8 yards of the goal, the clear space is on the outside of the penalty area.

The idea is good, although it feels as if the execution could be better if the pass were outswinging so that the ball is travelling towards the deep attacker so he can strike it sooner and more cleanly.

pic.twitter.com/lsfyDWd2gf

— Footie Clips (@FootieClips) February 19, 2025

Conclusion

This set-piece analysis reveals how Palermo have mastered a single, relentless structure during attacking corners, keeping the pressure on no matter the opposition.

With pinpoint deliveries, perfectly timed movements, and cunning decoy runs—combined with dominant control in the moments following the first contact—Palermo remain a constant set-piece threat under Alessio Dionisi’s coaching.

Even when their opponents know what’s coming, they’re powerless to stop it.


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