Phil Parkinson Tactics At Wrexham AFC 2024/2025: Ryan Reynolds & Rob McElhenney’s Promotion Machine Decoded – Tactical Analysis

The Wrexham fairytale embarks on its newest and most ambitious chapter yet in 2025/2026.

After back-to-back promotions under Phil Parkinson from National League to EFL League Two in 2022/2023 and then League Two to EFL League One in 2023/24, the Red Dragons have made it a three-peat of promotions in 2024/2025.

This means they’ll compete in England’s second-tier, the EFL Championship, in 2025/2026—just one step away from the glamour of the Premier League, which, perhaps, Ryan Reynolds & Rob McElhenney‘s Hollywood story is inevitably building towards.

Wrexham entered the 2024/2025 campaign with a good squad for the English third-tier, but promotion was far from guaranteed.

Phil Parkinson style of play within the Wrexham 3-5-2 system ensured they got the best out of the talent in their ranks in order to make this season a successful one.

Our Wrexham tactical analysis goes into detail on Phil Parkinson’s Wrexham tactics that got his side out of League One and into the Championship for 2025/2026.

Wrexham Long Ball Tactics

Arthur Okonkwo was Wrexham’s primary goalkeeper in the 2024/2025 campaign.

On top of some very solid numbers in terms of shot-stopping and command of his area when looking at the data, Okonkwo had a noticeable tendency to mainly hit the ball long from goal kicks.

Wrexham hit the most long passes of any League One side in 2024/2025 (57.93 per 90), with the goalkeeper naturally accounting for plenty of those long balls.

Parkinson’s side was not entirely predictable.

From time to time, they would shake things up with a short pass to one of the wide centre-backs, but, by and large, they tended to play it long right from their goal kicks.

Along with Okonkwo’s kick-outs (or centre-backs’ long passes, should they play the initial goal-kick short), Wrexham were armed with a few strikers capable of acting like target men—Ollie Palmer, Jay Rodriguez and Steven Fletcher.

One of these three would typically play just behind advanced forward Sam Smith, looking to knock the ball onto the faster number nine, aiming to exploit space behind the opposition’s backline.

This image provides an indication of how Wrexham (pink) might look after a kick-out is launched from Okonkwo in goal towards their target man centre-forward, with Smith lurking up top aiming to feed off the target man’s knock-on.

One wing-back would stay wide while the other wing-back would tuck in closer to the target man, helping the team’s chances of winning the second ball.

Similarly, Wrexham’s two more advanced central midfielders (usually Ollie Rathbone and George Dobson as a pair of ‘8s’) would also position themselves quite close to the target man to help the team’s immediate efforts to press the second ball.

Above, we see Jay Rodriguez going up to contest an aerial duel immediately after a goal kick.

Rodriguez successfully wins the aerial duel, knocking the ball on for Smith to chase in behind.

He then sets himself up to showcase his composure by slotting the ball away into the net.

We also see the support on the other side of the target man ready to press in case the ball were knocked down into midfield, though they weren’t needed on this occasion.

Ultimately, Wrexham’s main way of getting the ball upfield from goal kicks was a long ball towards a target man who had plenty of support around him, both in midfield and up front.

Wrexham’s quality in the centre-forward position, both in terms of the target men on offer and the advanced forward, Smith, made this an effective strategy.

Steven Fletcher (51.9%) and Ollie Palmer (49.46%) won the highest and third-highest percentage of aerial duels in League One among strikers with at least 800 minutes played this past season.

Sam Smith ended up scoring the joint-third-most goals of any EFL League One player this term as well, partly thanks to his ability to feed off the target men’s knock-ons, as Figure 2 displays.

Wrexham Chance Creation Tactics

However, Wrexham’s chance creation wasn’t all about the long ball from the back.

Similarly, Sam Smith didn’t just feed off the target men’s knock-ons.

The Red Dragons had more up their sleeves than just this to create goalscoring chances.

We typically found Parkinson’s side (pink) shaping up as seen above when the ball was at their feet in the attacking half.

The shape is only a small part of the whole picture, however.

Three key concepts also featured heavily in Parkinson’s Wrexham chance creation tactics.

They were:

• Positional rotations
• Central overloads
• Off-the-ball movement inside the box

In relation to the first two points, we first have to acknowledge that the above shape is just a broad template and is fairly flexible.

If a wide centre-back had an opportunity to step forward and help his team overload either the middle of the park or the wing, they would not hesitate to do so.

As a result, we quite often saw right centre-back Max Cleworth and left centre-back Thomas O’Connor step up either alongside holding midfielder Matty James to provide a sideways passing option in the centre if he was under pressure and needed an option or move up alongside their wing-back, either on the overlap or the underlap, to help the team build from out wide.

Central rotations were also fairly common between the midfield trio as they sought space to create options for teammates in the centre.

A centre-forward could also drop into midfield to help the team overload the middle of the park and either create a chance to get the ball into the box from there or, alternatively, find a wing-back in space out wide if that option were on and more attractive at that particular moment in time.

It’d mostly be on the centre-forwards to create separation from opposition centre-backs inside the penalty area to avail of a shooting opportunity if a midfielder or wing-back were able to pick them out.

Still, midfielders and wing-backs also frequently helped the team pack the box with bodies to ensure they had the best possible chance of, for instance, getting a shot off from a cross into the danger zone.

All these factors contributed immensely, in combination, to the team’s performance in the ball progression and chance creation phases of play this term.

Central overloads played a key role in Phil Parkinson’s Wrexham attacks in 2024/2025, whether by adding a wide centre-back to the midfield area, dropping a forward into midfield, or using positional rotations to manipulate opposition defenders’ positioning.

Just before Figure 4, Wrexham played into the middle of the pitch from the left wing.

The ball made its way to Jay Rodriguez via the left wing, which attracted an opposition midfielder towards the forward.

Rodriguez played the ball back to left central midfielder Rathbone, who then used an open passing lane across midfield to pass to Dobson.

We see Dobson in loads of space, scanning over his right shoulder as he prepares to receive centrally here from Rathbone.

This opportunity to play to a free Dobson in the middle of the park was created as a result of Wrexham initially dragging the opposition over to the left wing and then playing into the centre with an overload courtesy of Rodriguez’s deep-lying forward play.

Rodriguez finds wing-back Ryan Longman in space out on the right wing, and he is able to carry towards the box before chipping a cross towards Sam Smith.

Smith has created some space around himself on the edge of the six-yard box, which positions him well to get up over the defenders and nod the ball home as it reaches him.

This season, most of Wrexham’s assists came from their wing-backs—this passage of play provides a key example of why.

As the Red Dragons built their attacks, they overloaded the centre, thus dragging more opposition defenders centrally and creating space for their dangerous wing-backs to later use out wide.

As the wing-backs got into a good crossing position, other attackers flooded the penalty box.

They tried to separate themselves from the opposition defenders inside there to give themselves the best chance of scoring.

Parkinson and his coaching team did a good job of setting the team up to get their wide playmakers in good positions to make something happen regularly.

The attackers in the box frequently demonstrated high-quality movement to ensure the team frequently turned their final third entries via the wings into goalscoring opportunities.

Matty James typically played the deep-lying midfielder role for Wrexham.

He’s the one who usually sits in front of the back three in possession.

When his team was in the final third, he was often looked to as a safe backwards passing outlet for those positioned higher upfield when pressure mounted on those more advanced attackers.

This was due to James’ deeper positioning, which meant he naturally enjoyed more time and space on the ball as the team progressed into the chance creation phase, and opposition defenders got back behind the ball to protect their goal.

James is a capable long passer, however, and was able to spread the ball to wing-backs in space often from this position when given time and space in addition to potentially creating from there if the opportunity arose, as was the case in Figure 6.

Here, after James received the ball centrally, he got his head up and spotted Sam Smith beginning to make an inviting run in behind.

James played a perfectly weighted chipped ball over the top for Smith to run onto and volley home, creating a goal worthy of the big screen for the Wrexham faithful to cheer on.

This is another example of the diversity in Wrexham’s chance creation repertoire, which hinges on the Red Dragons’ ability to find players in space centrally and capitalise on Smith’s intelligent runs in behind, just as we saw earlier when analysing their long ball tactics.

Wrexham were always dangerous when playing up against a high line due to Sam Smith’s pace and intelligent runs.

Here, we see an example of Smith begging for a pass in behind as Burton Albion plays with a high line against Wrexham.

As the play moves on, we see that Ryan Longman times his through pass perfectly, as does Smith with his run, to ensure Wrexham are not called offside.

With this attack, they successfully get through in behind Burton Albion’s backline.

This again sets Smith up to show off his 1v1 ability as he storms through towards the goalkeeper, leading to a Wrexham goal as Smith calmly finds the far side of the net.

Wrexham Defence Tactics

Moving on to Phil Parkinson’s defence tactics at The Racecourse Ground this season, we see a typical example of how Wrexham (pink) set up out of possession in Figure 9.

Wrexham’s formation becomes a clear 5-3-2 in defensive phases.

They don’t typically press very aggressively, preferring to defend in the mid-to-low block.

Wrexham’s defensive tactics naturally offer quite a lot of protection in central areas.

Their three centre-backs, three central midfielders, and two strikers primarily focus on guarding the middle of the park, with the wing-backs tasked with defending the wings.

However, should the ball be switched out wide, the wing-back may step up to press the opposition’s wide man on the ball, which could lead to the backline shifting to that wing.

This would mean one of the wide centre-backs taking up a temporary full-back role in a 4-4-2.

Similarly, we’ve seen Wrexham’s wide central midfielders get dragged wide when defending the wings further upfield at times, which can also lead to one member of the back-five stepping up to add a body to the centre of the pitch.

This level of fluidity is necessary for Wrexham in order for Parkinson’s side to plug gaps that could open up and threaten the team’s defensive security.

However, all this shifting around in the defensive phases also opens up possibilities for the opposition to find and exploit gaps resulting from that out-of-possession movement that would not come if the defenders were stationary and solid.

Wrexham’s players need to be fully in sync with their movements, thinking, and defending as a unit as much as possible to ensure their defence stays secure in these moments.

The image above clearly shows how Wrexham’s defensive shape leaves them vulnerable to wide attacks.

Here, as the opposition play the ball out wide, they’re able to find a free man outside Wrexham’s midfield line but ahead of the left wing-back, who’s already occupied by a winger.

This creates an opportunity for the receiver to carry the ball forward into a dangerous wide playmaking position with time and space to decide on his next move.

As mentioned, Wrexham’s defence can be exposed when they’re pulled into defending high.

Here, the left central midfielder is dragged out wide as the opposition’s right-back receives.

This leaves Wrexham with just two players defending the centre, with the potential for the opposition to exploit space around or behind them quite high.

One team that showed how to play against Wrexham in this particular regard was Blackpool.

Blackpool successfully dragged Wrexham’s midfielders high with deep passing play, opening up space between the lines for their attackers to drop into.

As pthe lay moves on here, the left winger runs into the space shown to try and give his teammate on the ball a good passing option between the lines, but the run is a little late, and the option is not on once he gets there.

Later in that game, however, we saw a successful example of the same thing.

Blackpool passed the ball around deep, dragging Wrexham’s defence high, which stretched the Red Dragons vertically and opened up space for the right winger, this time, to drop into.

Blackpool find their man between the lines who’s dragging a centre-back out of defence with him.

This creates an excellent opportunity for Blackpool to get at a far weaker Wrexham defence structure than normal.

Conclusion

Overall, Wrexham’s defence offers great strength in the centre of the pitch, especially in the mid-to-low block phases.

They’re weaker defending the wings and defending high; both scenarios can lead to chances for the opposition.

When defending the wing or defending high, Wrexham’s defence can be forced to move around more than they ideally would.

This can lead to the opposition exploiting space resulting from that movement.

It then becomes a game of whether Wrexham are more in sync defensively and able to plug the gaps without issue or if the opponent is quicker and more fluid in possession, remaining one step ahead of the Red Dragons to break them down.

Wrexham’s attack generally starts direct and relies heavily on central overloads, creative wing-backs, positional rotations and smart off-the-ball movement—especially that of Sam Smith up front.