While everything seemed to be going well on the pitch, there was turmoil off it at Nottingham Forest.
After a historic season that saw Forest spend a lot of time in a UEFA Champions League place but eventually finish seventh, Nuno Espírito Santo’s job was in question.
Tension was building in the back rooms between him and owner Evangelos Marinakis over summer transfers, eventually leading to Marinakis sacking him three matches into the season.
Marinakis has brought in a fellow Greek and an old friend of the Premier League, Ange Postecoglou, to replace him.
Postecoglou delivered Tottenham Hotspur their first trophy since 2008, beating Manchester United in the UEFA Europa League Final, but a 17th-place finish in the Premier League ultimately cost him his job.
The move is surprising, considering that Nuno Espírito Santo and Ange Postecoglous tactical philosophies last season could not have been more different.
On the surface, it looks like a decision that will put NFFC back in the bottom half of the table or, worse, close to the relegation fight.
However, when we dig beneath the surface, Nottingham Forest were starting to change their tactical identity in the first three matches compared to how they played last season.
In this tactical analysis article, we’ll explore how Nottingham Forest set up tactically during the 2024/2025 season, the changes they’ve made three matches into the season, Ange Postecoglou tactics at Spurs, and how his tactics fit at Nottingham Forest.
Nottingham Forest Tactics 2024/2025
Nuno Espírito Santo’s Nottingham Forest last season was a team straight out of the 1980s & 90s.
It was old-school football built on routinely going long from goal-kicks, transition attacks, and compact mid-block defending.
Nottingham Forest rarely tried to build out of the back and almost always tried to send it long, consistently targeting Chris Wood and then trying to win second balls to play through balls in behind.
Nottingham Forest launched the ball from goal-kicks 65% of the time (the highest rate in the Premier League), averaged only 41.2% possession (third-lowest), and 17.4% of their pass attempts went long.
|
Team |
% of Passes Short | % of Passes Medium | % of Passes Long |
|
Everton |
41.02% |
38.49% |
20.49% |
|
Bournemouth |
40.70% |
41.68% |
17.62% |
|
Nottingham Forest |
45.33% |
37.27% |
17.40% |
|
Crystal Palace |
40.68% |
42.29% |
17.04% |
|
Brentford |
41.20% |
42.04% |
16.76% |
|
Ipswich Town |
41.66% |
42.75% |
15.59% |
|
Wolves |
45.24% |
39.89% |
14.87% |
|
West Ham |
44.59% |
40.73% |
14.69% |
|
Leicester City |
45.30% |
40.35% |
14.35% |
|
Fulham |
42.35% |
43.36% |
14.30% |
|
Brighton |
46.11% |
40.80% |
13.09% |
|
Newcastle Utd |
46.10% |
41.03% |
12.87% |
|
Southampton |
45.12% |
42.07% |
12.81% |
|
Manchester Utd |
47.20% |
40.18% |
12.61% |
|
Chelsea |
43.00% |
44.56% |
12.44% |
|
Liverpool |
45.03% |
42.74% |
12.24% |
|
Aston Villa |
44.28% |
43.55% |
12.17% |
|
Tottenham |
44.86% |
44.06% |
11.08% |
|
Arsenal |
48.30% |
41.27% |
10.43% |
| Manchester City | 50.37% | 41.02% |
8.62% |
Defensively, Nottingham Forest very rarely pressed high and sat in a mid-block at the highest rate of any Premier League side.
Everyone is pressing relentlessly in modern-day football, but Nottingham Forest were different.
Instead of pressuring the ball, Nottingham Forest would sit off and take away every possible pass centrally to either force the opponent to go out wide or to pass it backwards.
In this example against Brighton, the only option for the centre-back is to play it backwards and start over.
It was incredibly difficult for any team to play through the middle of Nottingham Forest, and oftentimes, when the ball was funnelled out wide, they would try to beat them with crosses.
Still, Murillo and Nikola Milenković were two of the best aerial duel winners in the Premier League.
