Benfica 2019/20: Defensive Transitions

The 2019/20 season has been a tale of two halves for Benfica. They started the season looking supreme and impervious to the opposition, picking up 55 out of a potential 57 points. This saw them lead the league with a comfortable six-point gap to Porto in second. However, fast forward to the present day, and they have not looked like the same side at all. Since losing to Porto at the start of February, they have managed one win in nine and have fallen two points behind Porto. One area which Benfica have particularly struggled, has been in covering counter-attacks, which this analysis will aim to convey.

Throughout this tactical analysis, we will be looking at Benficas approach to covering counter attacks including how they set up before a defensive transition, how they recover, patterns within their recovery, the strengths of their covering, and finally, where they need to improve.

Setup before defensive transitions

One key area to covering an opposition counter-attack is how much/little a team commits to their attacks. For example, if a team heavily commits to their attacks by deploying their fullbacks exceptionally high up the pitch, and simply leaving the two centre backs to cover transitions, it is less likely that the defenders will be able to stop them, compared to having three or four more cautious players in possession. This section will be relatively short, as we will only be looking at the immediate positions of players before, and momentarily after the ball has been lost.

For Benfica, there are usually three players, if not four who are more conservative in their offensive commitment. This includes the two centre backs, the full-back on the opposite side to possession (in the scenario that the ball is on the right, this will be the left-back), and sometimes the deeper midfielder in the pivot. This is down to the asymmetrical tactics employed by Lage, in which the full-back and the midfielder on his side push very high up and are heavily involved in the final third, whilst the other midfielder and fullback stay in more open space, just outside the final third, to provide alternative options.

In the example image below, we see the ball being progressed on the right-hand side. Tomas Tavares at right-back has pushed higher as he looks to overlap when Pizzi comes inside. On the opposite side, Grimaldo tucks in to make a three at the back, whilst Pires stays ahead of the middle centre back.

Pizzi misplaces his pass back to Ruben Dias, leaving the opportunity for Famalicao to counter. Looking at numerical advantages, Benfica out-number Famalicao attackers five to three, showing they are well placed to handle a mistake such as the one from Pizzi in this example.

Similarly, in the example below against RB Leipzig in the Champions League, Benfica lose the ball when trying to build out from the back. Whilst left centre back Ferro is slightly higher due to his build-up role, the usual shape remains. Grimaldo has pushed much higher, Almeida this time at right-back has dropped deeper alongside the centre backs, and the defensive midfielder completes the shape. This means that although Leipzig have committed plenty of players to an aggressive press, the situation is still a four against three at best for Leipzig.