Premier League 2019/20: Norwich City – set-piece analysis

After just a single season Norwich City have been relegated from the Premier League back to the EFL Championship. There are a multitude of factors that have contributed to the Canaries poor performance: ranging from macro-factors like a brittle defence, to a blunt attack. However, problems with defending set-pieces have plagued them all season – indeed throughout Daniel Farke’s tenure. Since the restart Norwich have conceded five goals from dead-ball situations (three from corners and two from free-kicks). These consistent issues and concessions seemingly indicate systemic weaknesses within Norwich’s structure. In this set-piece analysis, I will use analysis to see whether that is true.

This tactical analysis will look solely at Norwich’s tactics when defending set-pieces, and corners specifically.

Defensive structure

To properly understand why Norwich are poor at set-pieces we must look at their structure as a whole and then identify weaknesses within it.

As with most teams, Norwich utilise a mix of zonal and man-marking. This provides a balance, with the hope that deficiencies in either man-marking or zonal marking be offset by the other’s strengths. Farke splits it like this: five zonally mark, while another three are instructed to man-mark. I’ll expand on this further later but the personnel chosen to man-mark is a weakness in Farke’s defensive scheme.

Whilst aerial dominance is not a strength of the Norwich squad those most proficient zonally mark. Ben Godfrey and  from the restart  Timm Klose are these players. Therefore, they take up positions closest to Tim Krul in goal. This principle does not change whether the delivery is an in-swinger or out-swinger, albeit if the overarching structure adapts slightly to an alternative ball trajectory. Additionally, Alex Tettey occupies the far-post area, a more physical player so to cope with opponents seeking knock-downs.

The Norwich structure can be visualised above. Max Aarons has a dual role of preventing the ball going through the danger zone and being the man on the post. Due to his height (5’7”) such a role is understandable. The 10, Marco Stiepermann, is responsible for covering the near-portion and edge of the six-yard box. This has greater importance as it tends to be where runners from deep attack. Immediately behind Stiepermann is a line of three consisting of: Godfrey, Klose and Mario Vrančić. Because this zone is most likely to be where the corner-taker is aiming – especially with an in-swinger – this trio have to be aggressive, but disciplined in their actions.

This next example illustrates how the structure changes in the case of a potential short corner. When this happens, it is Aarons who leaves his position to move out, therefore creating a 2v2. Onel Hernández is already further out thanks to his original positioning, which is also evident in the first image. Furthermore, this picture shows the man-marking set-up more clearly. Teemu Pukki is seemingly marking Declan Rice. However, Jamal Lewis and Emi Buendía are not spaced optimally, with them both effectively occupying No.28 Tomáš Souček, thus leaving No.21 Angelo Ogbonna free.

Here shows how Norwich structure themselves for an out-swinger. The regular five are this time positioned in a diagonal line. Consequently, they are ready for whatever height the delivery ends up. This also provides superior body-orientation as instead of being square as you can have a more open body position, which is beneficial when competing in aerial duels.

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