Premier League 2019/20: Bournemouth

After five years in the Premier League Bournemouth’s time has come to an end. This has also now seen Eddie Howe leave the club. Howe’s assistant, Jason Tindall, has been confirmed as taking the reins from Howe, seeking immediate promotion from the EFL Championship. Whilst Bournemouth’s season was ultimately unsuccessful, the Cherries managed to be a productive side from set-pieces. Indeed, despite their 18^th place finish, managed to score 15 times from set-pieces. They have often been credited with creating inventive, complex routines in search of separation from markers. Furthermore, it seems that Tindall himself took the lead on set-pieces, with Howe giving his No.2 credit in the media. In this set-piece analysis, I will use analysis to look at these situations in-depth.

In this tactical analysis of Bournemouth’s set-pieces I will analyse their offensive tactics from set-pieces, corners specifically, and see why they have had such a great deal of success.

Near-post overloads

There can be a variety of methods that can be employed in order to hopefully generate a goalscoring opportunity. These can include blockers or diversion runners. Another method, however, can be overloading an individual zone. This can therefore help achieve positional superiority, whether in the immediate area or an underloaded zone elsewhere after a potential ricochet due to congestion, or an intentional flick-on. Indeed, this tactic is something that Bournemouth opt to use on many occasions. The Cherries are also known to incorporate decoy runs into their routines, to maximise space.

The taller, more aerially dominant players are those that directly attack the initial delivery. They begin their movements from deeper areas, to try and gain dynamic superiority over zonal markers located at the near-post, though this can be offset by effective man-markers. Additionally, attacking the ball at such an area means the delivery possesses more pace than it would at the far-post. Therefore, less power is likely required by the attacker to direct it towards goal.

The example above illustrates their overarching structure. No.13 Callum Wilson positions himself close to Jordan Pickford. There is logic in this in that it can impede Pickford, and restrict him from accessing the initial delivery. However, Wilson must be wary of being offside in the second phase, and cannot attack the corner himself due to it being an out-swinger. This positioning is much more worthwhile for an in-swinger, as where Wilson lends itself better for the trajectory. Joshua King is located at the far post, unmarked, and available for a flick-on. The forward is also on the blindside on several Everton defenders. There is the quartet of players who are the main attackers, in that their task involves seeking separation for themselves or a teammate to shoot. David Brooks is also situated on the edge of the box, in order to hopefully sustain attacks.

This next example shows attempts made to dismark at the near-post. Dominic Solanke (No.9) makes a slight forward movement. And because he is being man-marked this causes a minor amount of space to appear for Steve Cook to move into and exploit. We can also see Wilson attempting to impact play by moving in from the blindside.

Here is a routine that is similar, but altered just slightly. Compared to the previous instance involving Everton and their defensive structure for corners, Tottenham’s is significantly different. What is visible is how there is less occupation in the near-post zone. Consequently, Bournemouth adapt their offensive structure to exploit the increased space left vacant. This consists of Wilson now moving into this aforementioned space, instead of disrupting the keeper’s movements. Moreover, the usual quartet are more focussed on this space, with the majority making runs towards it. Naturally, this attracts defenders towards the near-post, thus emptying alternative areas, like the centre and far-post. Nathan Aké makes a counter-movement to his teammates, moving into the centre where there is more space than usual to these circumstances – the delivery isn’t accurate enough, however.